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ANTITRUST  ANTITEXTUALISM
Daniel A. Crane*
Judges and scholars frequently describe antitrust as a common-law system predicated on
open-textured statutes, but that description fails to capture a historically persistent phenomenon:
judicial disregard of the plain meaning of the statutory texts and manifest purposes of Congress.
This pattern of judicial nullification is not evenly distributed: when the courts have deviated
from the plain meaning or congressional purpose, they have uniformly done so to limit the reach
of antitrust liability or curtail the labor exemption to the benefit of industrial interests.  This
phenomenon cannot be explained solely or even primarily as a tug-of-war between a progressive
Congress and conservative courts.  The judges responsible for these decisions were far from uni-
formly conservative, Congress has not mobilized to overturn the judicial precedents, nor, despite
opportunities to do so, have the courts constitutionalized their holdings to prevent congressional
overriding.  Antitrust antitextualism is best understood as an implicit political arrangement in
which Congress writes broad statutes expressing anti-bigness republican idealism, and then the
courts read down the statutes pragmatically to accommodate competing demands for efficiency
and industrial progress.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars and judges widely agree that the U.S. antitrust statutes are
open-textured, vague, indeterminate, and textually unilluminating.1  They
© 2021 Daniel A. Crane.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.  I am very
grateful for many helpful comments from Tom Arthur, Jonathan Baker, Steve Calkins,
Dale Collins, Eleanor Fox, Rebecca Haw, Hiba Hafiz, Jack Kirkwood, Bob Lande,
Christopher Leslie, Alan Meese, Steve Ross, Danny Sokol, and other participants at the
University of Florida Summer Antitrust Workshop.
1 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 372–75,
409 (1978) (describing antitrust statutes as “open-textured”); WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 4 (Random
House 1965) (1954) (“From the beginning many men have criticized the [Sherman] Act as
vague, its meaning as elusive, its commands as ambiguous.”); Roger D. Blair & John E.
Lopatka, Albrecht Overruled—At Last, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 552 (1998) (critiquing the
Sherman Act’s “indefinite language” and “elusive meaning”); Douglas H. Ginsburg, An
Introduction to Bork (1966), COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring 2006, at 225, 225 (“The open-
textured nature of the [Sherman] Act—not unlike a general principle of common law—
vests the judiciary with considerable responsibility . . . to choose among competing val-
ues.”); William H. Page, Interest Groups, Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the
Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987 DUKE L.J. 618, 659 (“[T]he Sherman Act is so open
1205
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further agree that little use can be made of the statutes’ legislative histories.2
It follows that the antitrust statutes are best understood as a legislative delega-
tion to the courts to create an evolutionary and dynamic common law of
competition.3  As the Supreme Court explained in its landmark Leegin deci-
sion on resale price maintenance, “From the beginning the Court has treated
the Sherman Act as a common-law statute. . . .  Just as the common law adapts
to modern understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman
Act’s prohibition on ‘restraint[s] of trade’ evolve to meet the dynamics of
present economic conditions.” 4  In other words, the statutory texts disclose
little of importance; the action is all in dynamic judicial interpretation.
This view is so widely entrenched in the legal profession’s understanding
of the antitrust laws—including, it must be admitted, this author’s—that it
seems presumptuous to claim that the conventional wisdom is wrong, or at
least significantly overstated.  But it is.  While the antitrust statutes may be
lacking in some important particulars, they present a readily discernable
textured and the legislative history so vague, that any standard the Court adopts is ulti-
mately a judicial creation.”).
2 Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (“Congress . . .
did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or
its application in concrete situations.”); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT:
THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 20–160 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991); George E. Garvey,
The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will: Developing Standards for Criminal Intent in Sherman Act
Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 390, 417 (1980)  (noting that the Sherman Act’s
legislative history demonstrates that the Sherman Act “was deliberately intended to be
indefinite with specificity to be provided by the judiciary”); Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on
the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 232 (1995) (describing
prevailing views that the Sherman Act’s legislative history is “confused” (quoting From
Von’s to Schwinn to the Chicago School: Interview with Judge Richard Posner, Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, ANTITRUST, Spring 1992, at 4, 4)).
3 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 62 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that the Sherman Act
“invest[ed] the federal courts with a jurisdiction to create and develop an ‘antitrust law’ in
the manner of the common law courts”); William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers,
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661,
663 (1982) (“Congress adopted what is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a
common-law refinement of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most
general statutory directions.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV.
533, 544 (1983) (“The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good
example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1705 (1986) (“The Sherman
Act set up a common law system in antitrust.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers
of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (1985) (describing antitrust statutes as delegat-
ing to courts power to develop common law of antitrust).
4 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (altera-
tion in original); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732–33
(1988) (describing Sherman Act adjudication as a common-law process, drawing on pre-
Sherman Act common law precedents and dynamic common law); Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs,
435 U.S. at 688 (“The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it expected the courts
to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”).
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meaning on many others.  As Daniel Farber and Brett McDonnell have
argued, “For the conscientious textualist, the statutory texts [of the antitrust
laws] have considerably more specific meaning than the conventional wis-
dom would suggest.”5  And it is not simply the case that the meaning of the
statutory texts could be rendered through ordinary methods of statutory
interpretation but the courts have failed to see it.  Rather, the courts fre-
quently acknowledge that the statutory texts have a plain meaning, and then
refuse to follow it.
But it gets worse.  The courts have not merely abandoned statutory tex-
tualism or other modes of faithful interpretation out of a commitment to a
dynamic common-law process.  Rather, they have departed from text and
original meaning in one consistent direction—toward reading down the anti-
trust statutes in favor of big business.  As detailed in this Article, this unilat-
eral process began almost immediately upon the promulgation of the
Sherman Act and continues to this day.  In brief: within their first decade of
antitrust jurisprudence, the courts read an atextual rule of reason into sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act to transform an absolute prohibition on agree-
ments restraining trade into a flexible standard often invoked to bless large
business combinations; after Congress passed two reform statutes in 1914, the
courts incrementally read much of the textual distinctiveness out of the stat-
utes to lessen their anticorporate bite; the courts have read the 1936 Robin-
son-Patman Act almost out of existence; and the Celler-Kefauver
Amendments of 1950, faithfully followed in the years immediately after their
promulgation, have been watered down to textually unrecognizable levels by
judicial interpretation and agency practice.  It is no exaggeration to say that
not one of the principal substantive antitrust statutes has been consistently
interpreted by the courts in a way faithful to its text or legislative intent, and
that the arc of antitrust antitexualism has bent always in favor of capital.
Unlike in many debates over statutory interpretation, the issue in anti-
trust is not a contest between strict textualism and purposivism, including
resort to legislative history.6  This Article uses “antitextualism” as a shorthand
for the phenomenon of ignoring any bona fide construction of what a statute
means, whether in the plain meaning of its words, linguistic or substantive
interpretive canons, legislative history, or other ordinary markers of legisla-
tive meaning.  Uninterested in these methods, the courts have treated the
antitrust laws as a virtually unbounded delegation of common-law powers
when, in important ways, the statutes quite clearly say something other than
that.
Inquiring into the nature and implications of antitrust antitextualism is
particularly salient at the present when, for the first time in a generation,
there is widespread dissatisfaction with antitrust enforcement and impetus
5 Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?”  The Conflict
Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 623 (2005).
6 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 70 (2006) (examining differences between textualist and purposivist theories of statu-
tory interpretation).
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for potential reform legislation.7  As was true at each of the prior moments of
reformist sentiment, the call is for statutory reforms to curb the power of big
business.8  We have seen this play before, and also its sequel.  In the play,
Congress announces that the antitrust laws are too weak and that reforms are
necessary to protect the nation from the power of big capital.  In the sequel,
the courts (often abetted by the antitrust agencies and other antitrust elites)
read down the statutes to accomplish less than their texts suggest or Congress
meant.  Will anything be different this time around, or are the legislative
reforms currently on the table predestined to a similar fate?
To begin informing an answer to that question, this Article undertakes
to diagnose and analyze the longitudinal phenomenon of antitrust antitextu-
alism.  Part I sets the stage by contextualizing antitrust law within broader
jurisprudential conceptions of statutory regimes, statutory interpretation,
and legislative-judicial dynamics.  More specifically, it presents the conven-
tional understanding of the Sherman Act as a “super-statute” delegating
broad common-law powers to the courts, thus removing antitrust law from
usual controversies over statutory interpretation methodologies.9  It then
establishes that, if the conventional wisdom is wrong and the antitrust stat-
utes have determinate meanings that the courts are consistently ignoring in
favor of big capital, the most obvious inference is that the courts have an
ideological bias at odds with congressional purpose.  Part I concludes by
establishing a framework for assessing whether antitrust antitexualism gener-
ally represents a conservative judicial bias against the will of a more progres-
sive Congress.
Part II subjects the historical record of antitrust antitextualism to the
analytical framework described in Part I.  It presents the consistent pattern of
judicial disregard of the antitrust statutes’ text and purpose across all five of
the principal substantive antitrust statutes—the Sherman Act of 1890, the
FTC and Clayton Acts of 1914, the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, and the
Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, and shows that the pattern of judicial disregard
has a unilateral direction—toward softening the blow of the antitrust laws on
big business.  However, Part II also shows that the progressive Congress/con-
7 See Daniel A. Crane, Essay, Antitrust’s Unconventional Politics, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
118 (2018) (detailing rising political interest in antitrust law and reform).  Bills to reform
antitrust law include: 21st Century Competition Commission Act of 2017, H.R. 4686, 115th
Cong. (2017); Merger Retrospective Act of 2017, H.R. 4538, 115th Cong. (2017); Merger
Enforcement Improvement Act, S. 1811, 115th Cong. (2017); A Better Deal: Cracking Down
on Corporate Monopolies, SENATE DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/2017/07/A-Better-Deal-on-Competition-and-Costs-1.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2020); Klobuchar Introduces Legislation to Crack Down on Monopolies That Violate Antitrust Law,
U.S. SENATOR AMY KLOBUCHAR (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.klobuchar.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm/2019/8/klobuchar-introduces-legislation-to-crack-down-on-monopolies-that-vio-
late-antitrust-law (describing bill to add penalties for antitrust violations).
8 See ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, U.S. ANTITRUST LAW IN GLOBAL CONTEXT
787–801 (4th ed. 2020).
9 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1231–37 (2001) (analyzing Sherman Act as a “super-statute”).
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servative courts hypothesis fails to capture the burden of the historical
record.  In particular, the judges responsible for reading down the antitrust
statutes were not generally conservative by conventional measures, Congress
has not shown much interest in overriding the judicial recasting of the stat-
utes, and the courts have not undertaken to constitutionalize their holdings
in order to prevent congressional overrides, even though they had many
occasions to do so.  Something other than ideological conflict between the
legislative and judicial branches must be behind the phenomenon.
Part III offers a counterhypothesis—that the antitrust laws reside in per-
ennial tension between two fundamental impulses of the American political
psyche: the romantic and idealistic attachment to smallness over bigness, and
the pragmatic and often grudging realization that large-scale organization
may be necessary to achieve economic efficiency.  Congress expresses popu-
list idealism through legislative pronouncements reining in big business, but
then implicitly acquiesces as the courts (often in conjunction with the execu-
tive branch) read down the statutes to strike a balance between the aspira-
tional and pragmatic impulses.  For better or for worse, this is the way things
have worked for 130 years.  Part III concludes by considering the implications
of the idealistic Congress/pragmatic courts thesis for future legislative
reforms, the dynamism of the antitrust system, and jurisprudential under-
standing of legislative/judicial dynamics more generally.
I. ANTITRUST AS COMMON LAW
A. The Sherman Act as Indeterminate Super-Statute
The jurisprudence and theory of statutory interpretation is fraught with
conflict over interpretive modes and ideological bias.10  Textualists insist on
adherence to the plain or grammatical meaning of statutory language,
informed by linguistic canons of interpretation, while purposivists insist on a
wider set of interpretive tools, including resort to legislative history.11  Schol-
ars debate whether judges tend to follow their interpretative commitments
genuinely, or whether they instead follow their political or ideological com-
mitments under cover of ostensibly neutral interpretive principles.12  Schol-
10 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006).
11 See generally AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans.,
2005); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 269
(2019); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—And the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 685 (2014); Manning, supra note 6.
12 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227 (2d. ed. 2006) (arguing that judicial ideology plays impor-
tant role in statutory interpretation); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the
Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpre-
tation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1245–47, 1272 (2002) (challenging view that judicial ideol-
ogy plays a significant role in statutory interpretation); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers
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ars also analyze statutory interpretation as an ideologically driven exchange
between Congress and the courts, with swings in congressional ideology
affecting interpretive ideology on the courts.13
Antitrust law has largely been immune to such analysis as a mode of
contestable statutory interpretation because, across the ideological spectrum,
judges and scholars have assumed that the antitrust statutes do not behave
like ordinary statutes, with discernable, concrete mandates or meanings.14
Instead, antitrust has been assumed to operate as a broad delegation from
Congress to the courts to create a common law of competition within the
institutional constraints specified in the statute.15  In a leading theoretical
account, William Eskridge and John Ferejohn included the Sherman Act in
their roster of “super-statutes,” which
(1) seek[ ] to establish a new normative or institutional framework for state
policy and (2) over time does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect
on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute.16
Such statutes are often interpreted “beyond” their “plain meaning,” and
“[o]rdinary rules of construction are often suspended or modified when such
statutes are interpreted.”17  Eskridge and Ferejohn understand the Sherman
Act as a statute without much textual specificity that created an “ongoing
economics-focused dialogue among judges, executive branch officials, pri-
vate attorneys, academics (especially economists), and legislators and their
staffs.”18  Interpretation of the statute is “purposive rather than simple text-
bounded or originalist,” and the statute “generate[s] a dynamic common law
implementing its great principle and adapting the statute to meet the chal-
lenges posed to that principle by a complex society.”19
This view of the Sherman Act as common law unbounded by statutory
text enjoys virtually uncontested support across the ideological spectrum.
Thus, both a liberal like Justice John Paul Stevens and a conservative like
Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 40, 42–43 (1997)
(finding that from 1947 to 1992, Supreme Court Justices did not generally temper sincere
ideological preferences to rationally anticipate overrides by Congress); Cass R. Sunstein,
David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Pre-
liminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 302–307 (2004) (empirically studying effects of
judicial ideology on statutory interpretation); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not
an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 563
(2005).
13 Mario Bergara, Barak Richman & Pablo T. Spiller, Modeling Supreme Court Strategic
Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 262, 267–68 (2003)
(finding that percentage of liberal statutory interpretation decisions increased with liber-
alism of key congressional players).
14 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
16 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1216.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1232.
19 Id. at 1234.
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Justice Antonin Scalia could agree that, as to antitrust, the usual stakes over
statutory interpretation are off and all of the action is in applied common-law
decisionmaking.20  Of course, this does not mean that Stevens and Scalia
agreed on how to conduct common-law reasoning in antitrust cases.  In an
apparent role reversal from their ideological priors, on common-law method-
ology Scalia played the progressive and Stevens the conservative.  Scalia
argued for the “dynamic potential” of the common law, since the Sherman
Act invokes “the common law itself, and not merely the static content that
the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”21  Stevens by contrast,
wished for the Sherman Act to be interpreted “in the light of its common-law
background,” meaning that pre–Sherman Act common-law cases should be
considered particularly important to the ongoing meaning of the statute.22
While, in his colloquy with Stevens in Sharp, Scalia insisted the Court should
“not ignore common-law precedent concerning what constituted ‘restraint of
trade’ at the time the Sherman Act was adopted,”23 on another day he would
join with his conservative colleagues in “reaffirm[ing] that ‘the state of the
common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant’” to contemporary, eco-
nomically informed Sherman Act jurisprudence.24  One can fault the con-
servatives for inconsistency over whether the pre–Sherman Act common law
is entirely irrelevant or weakly relevant to contemporary antitrust common
law, but the important point for present purposes is that, in antitrust cases,
neither the conservatives nor progressives on the Court place any stock in
conventional contests over statutory interpretation methodology, accepting
instead common-law methodology as their battleground.
It bears underlining that, despite the consensus that antitrust is textually
unmoored common law, judicial and political ideology do play a significant
role in antitrust law, and the Supreme Court does sometimes split in predict-
able left/right patterns on antitrust issues.25  Recent examples include con-
ventionally conservative/liberal 5–4 divides over two-sided markets,26 price
squeezes,27 and resale price maintenance.28  But, again, these debates are
not expressed as contests over fidelity to statutory text or congressional pur-
pose, but rather as engagements over applied economic or institutional pol-
icy on such questions as the robustness of markets or the evolution of
20 See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (Scalia, J., major-
ity opinion); id. at 736–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 732 (majority opinion).
22 Id. at 736–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23 Id. at 731 (majority opinion).
24 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007) (quot-
ing Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977)).
25 For a collection of critiques of the courts as excessively influenced by conservative
Chicago School economics in antitrust cases, see generally HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
26 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
27 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
28 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 880, 882.
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industrial organization theory, and the capacity of various players in the sys-
tem (i.e., generalist Article III judges, juries) reliably to decide such ques-
tions.29  Conservatives trust markets and distrust regulatory interventions;
with progressives, it’s just the opposite, but these things can be hashed out in
a common-law style rather than parsing statutory texts or interrogating legis-
lative history.  By consensually denominating antitrust “common law,” judges
across the ideological spectrum agree to hash out their differences outside of
the framework of statutory interpretation, and all of its ideological baggage.
The conservatives, who usually demand statutory textualism in other fields,30
free themselves to argue for their preferred economic theories, as do the
progressives, who on other occasions might insist on a purposivist reading of
the statute.
B. A Framework for Considering Alternatives to the Common Law Thesis
At the risk of disturbing the pan-ideological consensus, this Article chal-
lenges the conventional wisdom that the antitrust statutes are textually inde-
terminate delegations of common-law power to the courts.  Coming next,
Part II will show that the antitrust statutes often have readily discernable
meanings that the courts simply ignore.  Moreover, contra Eskridge and Fer-
ejohn’s suggestion that that courts may be guided by a purposivist methodol-
ogy, Part II will show that the courts have consistently ignored not only what
Congress said in text, but what Congress evidently meant, as evidenced by
legislative history and other markers of congressional purpose.
But there is an even more significant reason to question the view that
the courts are simply gliding over statutory text in service of a flexible and
adaptive common-law strategy: over antitrust law’s 130-year history, the courts
have consistently deviated from text and purpose in a single direction—
toward reading down the antitrust statutes in favor of business interests and
against populist anti-bigness sentiment.31  If the Sherman Act and its progeny
were simply super-statutes delegating common-law powers to the courts, one
would expect to observe a more balanced pattern of deviation from the tex-
tual midline.  That the pattern is so consistently one-sided undermines any
inference that it is merely methodological as opposed to directive.  Some-
thing other than, or additional to, interpretive methodology must lie at the
root of antitrust’s antitextualism.
Once the claim that the antitrust statutes merely delegate common-law
powers to the courts is debunked, we are back to the terrain covered by most
disputes over interpretive methodology—the search for ideological sub-
text.32  An obvious hypothesis to explain the pattern of judicial nullification
29 See William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Domi-
nant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 53, 69.
30 Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 801 n.204 (1999); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 668 (1990).
31 Infra Section III.A.
32 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909, 947–60 (2016);
Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions of Statutory
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of apparent congressional will in order to favor big capital is that the Con-
gresses that passed the substantive antitrust statutes were more progressive or
anticorporate than the courts that then interpreted and applied those stat-
utes.  So, intuitively, the interpretive phenomenon of antitrust antitextualism
may reduce to a simple proposition: progressive Congress, conservative
courts.
Part II will dispute that simple view, but first two caveats.  The first caveat
is definitional and tautological.  If by “progressive” one means willing to vote
for a statute that textually reins in big business and by “conservative” one
means unwilling to give that statute its full textual or purposivist rendering,
then by definition antitrust antitextualism equates to comparatively progres-
sive Congresses and conservative courts.  However, as discussed further
below, a definitional and tautological approach fails to capture the legislative-
judicial dynamic in a way that provides meaningful insight.
Second, the comparative political ideology of the Congress and courts in
a conventional “left-right” sense does have some obvious explanatory power,
particularly when considered temporally.  For example, there is no doubt
that the New Deal Congress that passed the Robinson-Patman Act was more
populist, progressive, and anti-bigness than courts, influenced by the Chicago
School and conservative economic movements of the 1970s and ’80s, that
curtailed the Act.33  The question under consideration is not whether con-
ventional political ideology has played some role in antitrust antitextualism,
but whether it is the entire or even the leading explanation.  There are good
reasons to believe that it is not.
If antitrust antitextualism were primarily a manifestation of conventional
left/right ideology, one would expect to observe three kinds of markers.
First, the judicial decisions that nullified legislative text or purpose would
tend to be written by judges associated with the political right over the dis-
sents of judges associated with the political left.  As noted previously, com-
mon-law contestation over antitrust policy often codes in conventional left/
right terms, with more laissez-faire or pro-business judges often favoring
defendants whereas their peers to the left express more pro-regulatory or
anti-business views.  So one key question is whether the judicial voting pat-
terns reflecting antitrust antitextualism’s pro-business bias are identifiably
conservative by conventional measures.
Second, as is often the case in tussles between progressive legislatures
and conservative courts, Congress would react to judicial decisions that
flaunted its will by overriding those decisions by reform legislation.  When
Congress disapproves of statutory construction by a court, it often overrides
the judicial decision by amending the statute.34  For example, in recent
Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1215, 1232, 1243 (1990); Alexander Volokh, Choosing
Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769 (2008).
33 Supra note 25.
34 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers:
Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511 (2009).
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decades, Congress has overridden numerous conservative judicial decisions
regarding civil rights35 and disabilities.36  A 1991 empirical study by William
Eskridge concluded that “Congress and its committees are aware of the
Court’s statutory decisions, devote significant efforts toward analyzing their
policy implications, and override those decisions with a frequency heretofore
unreported.”37  Eskridge’s study found that, between 1967 and 1990, Con-
gress passed 187 override statutes overriding 344 judicial decisions.38
Eskridge’s study found that one factor that contributed to congressional over-
rides was “an ideologically fragmented Court.”39  Another empirical study
found that, between 1969 and 1988, Congress overrode Supreme Court inter-
pretation of statutes in 26.8% of cases involving economic regulation, far
more than in other areas.40  As with other important areas of federal policy,
the explanation for this congressional acquiescence in the courts’ antitrust
antitextualism cannot be that interested parties in or with access to Congress
were unaware of, or indifferent to, the common-law evolution of antitrust
policy.  An empirical study of congressional consideration of overruling anti-
trust decisions by the courts found 110 bills introduced to modify or overrule
antitrust decisions of the courts between 1950 and 1978 (of which only six
became public law).41  If judicial decisions reading down the antitrust stat-
utes were primarily the product of ideological contestation, one would
expect to see reaction by Congress in the form of periodic legislative amend-
ments to override the judicial interpretations.
35 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2, 16, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); see Eskridge, supra note 34, at 333 n.4
(explaining that Civil Rights Act overrode twelve Supreme Court decisions).
36 ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
37 Eskridge, supra note 34, at 334.
38 Id. at 338; see also Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317,
1318–19 (2014) (expanding and improving on earlier Eskridge study, and finding that
statutory overrides fell off after 1998).
39 Eskridge, supra note 34, at 334.
40 Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The Next Word: Congressional Response to
Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 445 (1992); see also Nancy C. Staudt,
René Lindstädt & Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation: Congressional Oversight of
Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1353–54 (2007) (finding that
Congress overrode eight percent of Supreme Court tax decisions).
41 Beth Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11
AM. POL. Q. 441, 446 (1983).  The article does not identify the six bills that became public
law.  The article concludes that “Congress rarely responds to the statutory decisions of the
Court” in antitrust cases. Id. at 453.  However, the period of the study, 1950 to 1978, coin-
cides with the period of most aggressive antitrust enforcement in American history and
ends just when the Chicago School revolution began to swing judicial decisions in a radi-
cally different direction.  This would therefore not be a period in which the pattern of a
more progressive Congress overruling a more conservative Supreme Court on antitrust
issues would be likely observed.
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A final test on the progressive Congress/conservative courts hypothesis is
the extent to which the courts have stretched the boundaries of constitu-
tional doctrines to immunize their preferred antitrust doctrines from legisla-
tive overriding.  By constitutionalizing antitrust doctrines in favor of big
business, the courts could prevent congressional end runs through reform
bills.  There is no shortage of examples of courts constitutionalizing doc-
trines that might have been left to statutory interpretation absent a suspicion
that Congress would override the doctrines through legislation.  Consider,
for instance, the constitutionalization of citizen standing doctrines through
Article III injury requirements,42 or of Miranda warning as against congres-
sional intermeddling.43
The Court’s practical ability to constitutionalize a preferred doctrine is
limited by the reasonable elasticity of the relevant constitutional text or estab-
lished doctrines.  A court in an ideological battle with Congress is more likely
to deploy constitutional doctrines when such moves are within the contesta-
ble range of constitutional law than when constitutionalization would be
widely regarded as doctrinally illegitimate and hence call into question the
Court’s legitimacy.  The courts’ failure to constitutionalize key aspects of anti-
trust law would be more significant in assessing the courts’ atextual statutory
readings if there were readily available constitutional doctrines that could
have been deployed than if such moves would have required constitutional
adventures.  Thus, the analysis that follows considers the courts’ failure to
constitutionalize aspects of antitrust law as most relevant when constitutional
doctrines were readily available to immunize judicial doctrines from congres-
sional overriding.
The following Part presents the historical narrative of antitrust antitextu-
alism, with particular reference to whether the emerging pattern supports
the progressive Congress/conservative courts hypothesis.  In particular, it
asks whether the courts that read down the antitrust statutes were predomi-
nantly conservative by conventional measures, whether Congress responded
by overriding the judicial interpretation, and whether the courts attempted
to draw on available constitutional doctrines to immunize their rulings from
congressional overrides.
II. ANTITRUST ANTITEXTUALISM AS IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT
Congress has legislated substantively on antitrust on five principal occa-
sions—in 1890 with the passage of the landmark Sherman Act,44 the founda-
tional American antitrust law; in 1914 with the passage of the Progressive-era
Clayton45 and Federal Trade Commission Acts;46 in 1936 with the passage of
42 James E. Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6
BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 85 (2017).
43 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
44 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
45 Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
46 Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
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the anti-chain-store Robinson-Patman Act;47 and in 1950 with the passage of
the Celler-Kefauver Act,48 designed to arrest a “rising tide of economic con-
centration” in the post-War economy.49  Each of these statutes has been sub-
ject to extensive interpretation by the courts, and each of them has been read
down from its plain textual meaning and legislative understanding in favor of
business.  However, with some exceptions, this pattern of judicial disregard
for text and legislative purpose did not track conventional ideological pat-
terns.  The judges reading down the statutory texts were not predominantly
conservative, Congress usually did not overrule the judicial interpretation
through reform legislation, and, despite ample grounds to do so, the courts
did not constitutionalize their decisions to insulate them from congressional
overrides.
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: “Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal.”50  Whatever else “contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce” means, it is tex-
tually inescapable that all such contracts are illegal.  And so the Supreme
Court recognized in its first foray into interpreting the Sherman Act—United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n.51  The defendant railroads invoked a
“rule of reason” and argued that their cartel agreement should be deemed
lawful as a reasonable restraint of trade.52  Justice Peckham’s majority opin-
ion accepted the government’s interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act53 and rejected the cartelists’ argument on textualist grounds, finding no
textual room for a rule of reason in section 1.  The “strict language of the
act” permitted “no escape from the conclusion” that all agreements in
restraint of trade were illegal.54
47 Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
48 Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950).
49 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).
50 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1).
51 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
52 Id. at 303.
53 Judson Harmon, Brief for the United States in the Case of the United States of America v.
the Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 6 YALE L.J. 295, 304, 311–13 (1897).
54 Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 312.  Justice White’s dissenting opinion put the
government’s textual argument, accepted by the majority, most directly: “Congress has said
every contract in restraint of trade is illegal.  When the law says every, there is no power in
the courts, if they correctly interpret and apply the statute, to substitute the word ‘some’
for the word ‘every.’  If Congress had meant to forbid only restraints of trade which were
unreasonable it would have said so; instead of doing this it has said every, and this word of
universality embraces both contracts which are reasonable and unreasonable.” Id. at 345
(White, J., dissenting).
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Peckham rested the Court’s rejection of the rule of reason on text and
disdained any inquiry into the Sherman Act’s legislative history out of “a gen-
eral acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in Congress are not appropri-
ate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the
language of a statute passed by that body.”55  However, had he inquired into
the legislative history, he would not have found anything compelling a revi-
sion of his Trans-Missouri holding.  Although the Sherman Act’s legislative
history may be too muddled to be of great help interpretatively,56 what
themes can be gleaned from it are at best mixed on the question of grafting a
rule of reason of the open-ended kind eventually adopted in Standard Oil and
subsequently elaborated in Justice Louis Brandeis’s Chicago Board of Trade
opinion.57
No sooner had the Court resisted the siren song of antitextualism than it
began to succumb.  The year after rejecting the rule of reason under section
1 in Trans-Missouri, Justice Peckham wrote again for the Court in United States
v. Joint Traffic Ass’n,58 this time appearing to apply a form of the rule of rea-
son, albeit in continuing to find liability under section 1.59  A year later, the
Court affirmed then-Judge Taft’s rule of reason analysis in United States v.
Addyston Pipe,60 again finding liability under section 1 but holding out the
possibility that a reasonable ancillary restraint of trade might be lawful
despite section 1’s textual absolutism.
The Court’s equivocation between fidelity to statutory text and engraft-
ing a rule of reason into section 161 ended in 1911 in Standard Oil62 (and
55 Id. at 318 (majority opinion).
56 Supra note 2 and accompanying text.
57 See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman
Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1986) (rejecting idea that legislative history shows that Congress
meant to make a broad delegation of rule of reason determinations to courts); Gary R.
Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, the Rule of Reason, and the Doc-
trine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 943, 999 (1988) (arguing that neither text nor
legislative history of Sherman Act support importation of rule of reason into section 1 of
Sherman Act).
58 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
59 WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 90 (1914)
(asserting that “the much-criticized ‘rule of reason’ of the Chief-Justice was only a change
of phrase from the expression which Mr. Justice Peckham had himself used as the guide to
a proper construction of the statute”).  The Supreme Court has attributed the origins of
the rule of reason to Joint Traffic.  State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997); Arizona v.
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1982).
60 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278, 296 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
61 In 1904 in Northern Securities, Justice Harlan’s majority opinion interpreted the
Court’s earlier decisions, particularly Trans-Missouri, as holding that section 1 “is not lim-
ited to restraints of interstate and international trade or commerce that are unreasonable
in their nature, but embraces all direct restraints imposed by any combination, conspiracy,
or monopoly upon such trade or commerce.”  N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,
331 (1904).  In concurrence, and underscoring the longer trajectory of the Court’s move-
ment away from statutory text, Justice Brewer expressed regrets for having signed off on
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again two weeks later in American Tobacco),63 with Justice White prevailing in
the antitextualist views he had expressed in dissent in Trans-Missouri.64  The
government maintained the textual position that Peckham had launched in
Trans-Missouri, insisting that the “language of the statute embraces every con-
tract, combination, etc., in restraint of trade, and hence its text leaves no
room for the exercise of judgment, but simply imposes the plain duty of
applying its prohibitions to every case within its literal language.”65  Justice
White, however, attempted to evade the need to insert the adjective “unrea-
sonable” into the statutory text by insisting that the rule of reason sprang
directly from the common-law meaning of “restraint of trade,” against which
Congress had created the Sherman Act.66
If it were plausible to read “restraint of trade” as a common-law term of
art inherently calling for a reasonableness analysis, that possibility was belied
by the Court’s subsequent opinions, which made explicitly clear that the rule
of reason syntactically required distinguishing reasonable restraints of trade
from unreasonable ones.  Justice Brandeis showed the Court’s cards in Chi-
cago Board of Trade,67 beginning with the observation that the category of
“restraint[s] of trade” was broad and general insofar as “[e]very agreement
concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.  To bind, to restrain, is
of their very essence.”68  The “true test of legality” for a restraint of trade was
its reasonableness or unreasonableness, viz. whether it “regulates and per-
haps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition,”69 an inquiry that required resort to a litany of
open-ended factors.70
Trans-Missouri’s rejection of the rule of reason in light of the “long course of decisions at
common law” affirming reasonable restraints of trade. Id. at 360–61 (Brewer, J., concur-
ring).  In Shawnee Compress Co. v. Anderson, 209 U.S. 423, 434 (1908), the Court again
repeated in passing that section 1 prohibited not merely unreasonable restraints of trade,
but “all direct restraints of trade,” inserting an adjective (“direct”) quite as atextual, and as
serviceable in loosening the Sherman Act’s strict prohibition on restraints of trade, as
“unreasonable.”
62 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911).
63 United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911).
64 Standard Oil’s adoption of a rule of reason was largely a foregone conclusion by
1911. LETWIN, supra note 1 at 265 (arguing that White’s opinion in Standard Oil changed
nothing); Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 801–05 (1965) (asserting that substance of law was not changed
at all in Standard Oil).
65 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63.
66 Id. at 63 (“[I]t is obvious that judgment must in every case be called into play in
order to determine whether a particular act is embraced within the statutory classes, and
whether if the act is within such classes its nature or effect causes it to be a restraint of
trade within the intendment of the act.”).
67 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
68 Id. at 238.
69 Id.
70 Id. (holding that relevant rule of reason considerations include “the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
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Following Chicago Board of Trade, the Court abandoned any pretense that
its rule of reason jurisprudence was in service of identifying “restraints of
trade” rather than figuring out which ones were reasonable or unreasonable.
Unreasonable restraints of trade were unlawful,71 and reasonable ones were
lawful.72  Over time, the Court began to acknowledge explicitly that its sec-
tion 1 jurisprudence was atextual, or even antitextual,73 best encapsulated in
the Court’s announcement in National Society of Professional Engineers that “the
language of § 1 of the Sherman Act . . . cannot mean what it says.”74
Whether or not it could mean what it said, the Court had certainly inter-
preted it not to.
Up through Standard Oil, the immediate consequences of engrafting a
rule of reason onto section 1 were small, since the restraints of trade in ques-
tion were usually found unlawful even under the rule of reason.  But, Chicago
Board of Trade opened the door for rule of reason analysis to result in exoner-
ation of the challenged restraint, and, over time, rule of reason analysis
became a “euphemism for nonliability.”75  In recent years, rule of reason
analysis has swung in the direction of a genuine mode of analysis leading to
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable[;] [t]he history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be attained”).
71 See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 455 (1986) (restraint illegal
because it “was an unreasonable and conspiratorial restraint of trade in violation of § 1”);
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 139 (1966) (asking whether location
clause was “unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act”); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927) (“That only those restraints upon inter-
state commerce which are unreasonable are prohibited by the Sherman Law was the rule
laid down by the opinions of this Court in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases.”).
72 See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (recognizing that “this Court
has not taken a literal approach” to the language of section 1 but has held that “‘Congress
intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints’”) (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 10 (1997) (emphasis in original))); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 14
(1945) (“[T]rade restraints might well be ‘reasonable,’ and therefore not in violation of
the Sherman Act.”); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 217 (1940)
(observing that restraint in Chicago Board of Trade survived because it was “a reasonable
restraint of trade”); Nat’l Ass’n of Window Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403, 413
(1923) (“It is enough that we see no combination in unreasonable restraint of trade . . . .”).
73 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“While
§ 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts, see, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), the Court has never ‘taken a literal approach to [its]
language,’ Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006).  Rather, the Court has repeated time
and again that § 1 ‘outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.’ State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
10 (1997).” (alterations in original)); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332,
342–43 (1982) (“In United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 U.S. 505 (1898), we recognized
that Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the word ‘every’ . . . .”).
74 Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978).
75 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977); see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical
Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 71 (1991) (describ-
ing rule of reason analysis as a rule of de facto nonliability).
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potential condemnation of the challenged restraint,76 but section 1 jurispru-
dence remains fundamentally at odds with the statute’s absolutist text.  A flat
prohibition on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade
has become a mandate for courts to decide, based on shifting social and eco-
nomic theories, which restraints are good and which are bad.77
Although the Supreme Court’s Sherman Act jurisprudence evidences
disregard for the text and evident purpose of section 1, it does not track
conventional political ideology.  If there is one case decided during anti-
trust’s formative period that best encapsulates conventional understandings
of judicial ideology relating to business regulation, it is Lochner v. New York.78
The majority opinion in Lochner was authored by the laissez-faire New York
Democrat Rufus Peckham, a confidant of J.P. Morgan, Cornelius Vanderbilt,
and John D. Rockefeller, often suspected of a pro-business disposition
because of his personal relationships with the Robber Barons.79  But it was
Peckham who wrote the Trans-Missouri opinion insisting on antitrust textual-
ism and rejecting the rule of reason.80  Meanwhile, it was the Lochner dis-
senter (Southern Democrat) Edward Douglass White who led the charge for
the rule of reason through his dissent in Trans-Missouri and ultimate triumph
(as Chief Justice) in Standard Oil.81  Only one Justice—John Marshall
Harlan—dissented from the Court’s adoption of the rule of reason in Stan-
76 See,e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (upholding pharmaceutical com-
pany’s liability for pay for delay patent settlements under the rule of reason); In re Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir.
2020) (finding NCAA’s rules limiting compensation to student athletes unlawful under
rule of reason); O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015)
(finding NCAA’s rules prohibiting student athletes from profiting from their image or
likeness violated rule of reason); United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir.
2003) (finding Visa and Mastercard’s exclusivity rules violated rule of reason).
77 One could dispute that the courts were antitextual in reading a rule of reason into
the Sherman Act on the grounds that various members of the Congress that adopted the
Sherman Act insisted that they were merely enacting existing common-law principles and
that the principal drafters of the Sherman Act’s language, particularly George Edmunds
and George Hoar, were experienced commercial lawyers familiar with the common-law
meaning of “contracts in restraint of trade.” See LETWIN, supra note 1, at 94–95; Felix H.
Levy, The Federal Anti-Trust Law and the “Rule of Reason,” 1 VA. L. REV. 188, 188–90 (1913).
But, in that case, there was a much easier path to textual fidelity than engrafting a rule of
reason onto section 1 of the Sherman Act—the path Justice White suggested in Standard
Oil of hanging section 1 analysis on the historical meaning of “restraint of trade.”  As noted
in this Article, the Supreme Court abandoned that position after Standard Oil in favor of
self-described antitextualism.
78 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
79 HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 116 (5th ed. 2008); MELVIN I. UROF-
SKY, THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 351 (1994).
80 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); supra notes 53–54
and accompanying text.
81 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 30 (1911); Trans-Mo., 166 U.S.
290, 343 (White, J., dissenting); supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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dard Oil.82 Lochner dissenters Holmes, White, and Day joined the majority, as
did the newly appointed (former Progressive New York Governor and
Supreme Court centrist) Charles Evans Hughes.83
Standard Oil was not the product of Lochnerism, but the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of the rule of reason provoked a sharp political
response.  The 1912 Democratic Party platform expressed “regret that the
Sherman anti-trust law has received a judicial construction depriving it of
much of its efficiency” and pledged “the enactment of legislation which will
restore to the statute the strength of which it has been deprived by such inter-
pretation.”84  But, even after Woodrow Wilson’s victory in 1912 and with the
Democratic Party controlling both houses of Congress in 1914, neither of the
1914 reform statutes expelled rule of reason analysis from section 1 of the
Sherman Act.  To the contrary, the legislative history reveals that Congress
intended the 1914 reform statutes to play an “educational role” to help
inform business people of the content of the rule of reason.85  Far from
rejecting the rule of reason, the 1914 statutes implicitly codified it by not
overriding it.86  Four years later, Justice Louis Brandeis, Woodrow Wilson’s
chief advisor on antitrust issues and the 1914 legislative reforms,87 would
author the Supreme Court’s archetypal recitation of the rule of reason in
Chicago Board of Trade.88
Turning to the final evaluative factor concerning the progressive Con-
gress/conservative courts hypothesis, the federal courts have declined to con-
stitutionalize their Sherman Act jurisprudence, despite frequent invitations
to do so and the ready availability of constitutional doctrines that could have
served.89  From Joint Traffic Ass’n90 through Nash,91 litigants repeatedly
82 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 82 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 65 (Harlan, J., joined by White & Day, JJ., dissenting); id. at 74
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
84 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840–1956, at 168–69 (Donald Bruce Johnson
comp., rev. ed. 1978)
85 Thomas B. Leary, The Muris Legacy, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Nov. 2004, at 1, 7; see also
Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 278 (discussing
FTC and Clayton Acts as response to, but not overruling of, Standard Oil’s endorsement of
rule of reason).
86 Similar patterns emerge in other areas where Congress passed antitrust reform stat-
utes.  For instance, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, which permitted states to pass resale
price maintenance laws that would otherwise have contravened the Sherman Act as the
Supreme Court had interpreted it, arose in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). See Peritz, supra note 85,
at 297–98.  However, Congress did not go so far as to overrule Dr. Miles, but only created
an option for states to opt out of Dr. Miles’s rule, which remained the baseline. Id.
87 Kenneth G. Elzinga & Micah Webber, Louis Brandeis and Contemporary Antitrust
Enforcement, 33 TOURO L. REV. 277, 285 (2017) (explaining Brandeis’s role as Wilson’s eco-
nomic adviser and architect of FTC Act).
88 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 235 (1918).
89 The one important exception is the Court’s early, narrow definition of interstate
commerce for purposes of the Sherman Act, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1
(1895), a framework the Court quickly walked back in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
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raised constitutional challenges to application of the Sherman Act, sounding
in both substantive and procedural due process (void for vagueness) and
equal protection, and the courts soundly rejected them.92  Application of
due process or equal protection constraints to limit the reach of federal anti-
trust law was well within the range of available constitutional doctrines, as
evidenced by the Court’s willingness to invalidate state antitrust statutes93
and other federal statutes94 on similar grounds.95  Yet, even while reading
down the statutory texts, the courts declined to constitutionalize their hold-
ings, for example by suggesting that such atextual readings were required by
constitutional principles.96
The atextual creation of the rule of reason during antitrust’s formative
period certainly reflected a collision of interpretive, social, and political com-
mitments, but not in a way that substantiates the inference of an ideological
contest between Congress and the courts in conventional left/right terms.
375 (1905), and buried in Standard Oil. See Bruce Johnsen & Moin A. Yahya, The Evolution
of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 403,
414–15 (2004).
90 United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 559, 565–66 (1898).
91 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376, 378 (1913).
92 Alan J. Meese, Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 61, 64
(1999).
93 Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 456 (1927) (invalidating on vagueness
grounds Colorado law allowing fixing of prices if they were reasonable); McFarland v. Am.
Sugar Refin. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 81, 86–87 (1916) (invalidating on equal protection grounds
Louisiana statute making payment to out-of-state refiners of higher prices than those paid
to in-state refiners prima facie evidence of antitrust violation); Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223 (1913) (invalidating on vagueness grounds Kentucky statute
prohibiting “combining to depreciate below its real value any article, or to enhance the
cost of any article above its real value”).
94 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 89–91 (1921) (invalidating on
vagueness grounds provisions of Lever Act prohibiting conspiracies to charge unreasona-
ble prices).
95 See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 847 (1965) (observing that interpretive problem faced by Justices
Peckham, Taft, and White with respect to the Sherman Act was not unlike the problem
they faced in the statutes the Court invalidated on vagueness grounds); Matthew G. Sipe,
The Sherman Act and Avoiding Void-for-Vagueness, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 717 (2018)
(observing that text of Sherman Act was just as vague as that of Lever Act invalidated in
Cohen Grocery).
96 The Court’s interpretive moves in antitrust cases sometimes channeled the Court’s
constitutional values.  For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919), permitting manufacturers to announce a minimum resale
price and refuse to do future business with any retailer not adhering to it, expresses Loch-
ner-era freedom of property and contract themes. See Edward P. Krugman, Soap, Cream of
Wheat, and Bakeries: The Intellectual Origins of the Colgate Doctrine, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 827,
829, 835 (1991).  But while interpreting the Sherman Act in the light of its constitutional
values, the Court did not go so far as to constitutionalize its statutory decisions in a way that
would have precluded Congress from overriding them.
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B. The Clayton Act
1. Labor Exemption
From the beginning, labor was antitrust’s bête noire.  A statute obviously
designed to rein in the capitalist class—the trusts—was quickly turned against
labor organizations and boycotts, with the consequence that out of the first
thirteen successful prosecutions under the Sherman Act, twelve were
directed against labor.97  By 1914, Congress had decided to remove the labor
question from antitrust entirely.  It did so with simple elegance in section 6 of
the Clayton Act, stating that “the labor of a human being is not a commodity
or article of commerce.”98  The following sentences of section 6 went on to
exclude labor, agricultural, and horticultural organizations from the reach of
the antitrust laws, a coda that would create interpretive confusion down the
road.99  Section 20 of the Clayton Act prohibited the issuance of injunctions
in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and
employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and per-
sons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concern-
ing terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the
application.100
The combined effect of sections 6 and 20 was meant to “immunize pressure
or agreements with the purpose of fixing the price of labor or stabilizing
labor standards” and to eliminate the “issuance of injunctions specifically
against primary strikes and boycotts, peaceful patrolling, refusals to patron-
ize, and related acts” in the context of labor disputes.101
It did not take long for the Supreme Court to thwart the plain meaning
of the statutes.  In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering102 and American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council,103 the Court held that sections 6
and 20 only prevented the issuance of injunctions as to disputes between
employers and employees in a direct employment relationship.  In Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters’ Ass’n of North America,104 the Court
97 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 229 (1991).
98 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17).
99 Id. (“Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exis-
tence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid
or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legiti-
mate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-
trust laws.”)
100 Clayton Act § 20 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 52).
101 Milton Handler & William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The
Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 469 (1981).
102 254 U.S. 443, 471–74 (1921).
103 257 U.S. 184, 202 (1921).
104 274 U.S. 37, 55 (1927).
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held that section 20 did not immunize secondary boycotts, conduct that had
been unlawful prior to 1914.  Most significantly and doing the greatest vio-
lence to the text of the Clayton Act, in Apex Hosiery, the Supreme Court read
the “commodity or article of commerce” clause of section 6 as merely a pre-
amble to the subsequent “labor organization” provisions, giving the prior
clause no independent force or effect.105
The Court’s dismissal of the “commodity or article of commerce” clause
was preemptory, treating seriously neither the statute’s text nor legislative
history.106  As a textual matter, the excision of any independent force or
effect to the “commodity or article of commerce” clause would have been
difficult to defend.  The “commodity or article of commerce” clause applies
solely to human labor; the subsequent provisions to labor, agriculture, and
horticulture.  The provisions regarding agricultural and horticultural organi-
zations function on a freestanding basis without any prior qualification or
introduction, so there is no textual necessity or function for a clause merely
introducing a limited exemption for labor organizations.  Unless the “com-
modity or article of commerce” clause has some meaning independent from
the subsequent clauses regarding organizations, the former clause is mere
surplusage—a result the Court otherwise insists must be avoided in constru-
ing statutes.107  Nor does the Clayton Act’s legislative history support the evis-
ceration of the “commodity or article of commerce” clause.  What legislative
history there is suggests that while Congress did not have a definite idea of
the meaning or reach of the “commodity or article of commerce” clause and
understood it as related to the subsequent provision regarding labor organi-
zations, it also understood the clause as freestanding and independently sig-
nificant.108  The Court effectively excised that clause from the statute in Apex
105 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 515 (1940) (“The reference in the last
clause to ‘such organizations’ has manifest reference to what precedes, and the immunity
conferred is only with respect to the ‘lawfully carrying out’ of their ‘legitimate objects.’”
(quoting Clayton Act § 6)).
106 By contrast, in 1970, Judge Walter Mansfield, a federal district judge soon to be
elevated to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, engaged in a more
thorough analysis of the issue, reaching the same conclusion: “[I]n the light of the statute’s
legislative history, [the statute’s additional language] convinces us that the sole purpose
and effect of the section is to exempt activities and agreements on the part of labor, agri-
cultural or horticultural organizations with respect to their furnishing labor in the market
place.”  Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).  As noted above,
Judge Mansfield’s analysis is inconsistent with both the text of the statute and the legisla-
tive history showing that Congress intended for the “commodity or article of commerce”
clause to have independent effect.
107 E.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1132 (2016) (observing that Court
tries to construe to avoid superfluity).
108 The clause was drafted by Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation
of Labor, and proposed in the Senate debate over the Clayton Act in response to
Gompers’s claim that it was “an outrage upon our language” to construe the Sherman Act
as applicable to “men and women who own nothing but themselves and undertake to con-
trol nothing but themselves and their power to work.”  2 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 1260–63, 1794 (Earl W. Kintner ed.,
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Hosiery and has never looked back.109  The consequence of the judicial disre-
gard of the “commodity or article of commerce” clause has been that the
statutory labor exemption and judicially created nonstatutory exemption
focus almost exclusively on unilateral labor bargaining around unionization
activity, as opposed to immunizing from antitrust scrutiny the full set of
agreements around transactions in human labor.110
As with the Sherman Act, however, conservative judicial ideology is not a
fitting explanation for the Court’s reticence to enforce section 6 of the Clay-
ton Act’s removal of all labor issues from antitrust. Apex Hosiery was written
by the political moderate Justice Harlan Stone, over dissents by Chief Justice
Hughes, the archconservative anti–New Dealer James McReynolds, and
Owen Roberts who often joined the “Four Horsemen” in striking down New
Deal legislation.  Since Apex, the Supreme Court has treated the “commodity
or article of commerce” clause as a dead letter without objection from any
ideological quarter, nor any effort to constitutionalize antitrust’s application
to labor.
The Supreme Court’s pre–New Deal labor/antitrust decisions did meet
with limited congressional override, but only on the issue of injunctions.  The
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 eliminated federal equity jurisdiction over enu-
merated conduct arising in the context of “labor disputes,” and was intended
to overturn judicial interpretations of section 20 of the Clayton Act that had
allowed courts to continue to issue injunctions against labor strikes despite
1978).  In response to a proposed amendment by Senator Culberson that would have com-
bined the “commodity or article of commerce” clause with the subsequent sentence, Sena-
tor Cummins argued that the clause would be “more impressive and more logical” if
deployed as “a sentence by itself” and should not be commingled with the subsequent
sentence, which also applied to agriculture and horticulture.  3 id. at 2378.  The clause was
meant to make a categorical moral statement removing human labor from antitrust.
109 The only viable defense of the Court’s atextual reading of the Clayton Act’s labor
provisions would be that the passage of further federal statutes addressing labor injunc-
tions and labor relations—particularly the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and the Wagner
Act (National Labor Relations Act) of 1935—amended the effect of the Clayton Act.  So
the Court suggested in Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in United States v. Hutcheson, observing
that the Sherman Act, section 20 of the Clayton Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act read as
a “harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct.”  312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).  Such inter-
pretive harmonization may be plausible as to section 20 and Norris-LaGuardia, but no post-
1914 statute has amended or implicated section 6’s declaration that human labor isn’t
commerce, full stop.
110 See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004) (examining
contemporary scope of statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions).  Thus, for example,
when a group of D.C. lawyers serving indigent criminal defendants agreed not to take any
new representations until the D.C. court system increased their compensation, the D.C.
Circuit observed that they would not qualify for the Clayton Act’s labor exemption because
they were not a “labor organization” within the meaning of section 6.  Superior Ct. Trial
Laws. Ass’n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 230 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Nevermind that, under the
plain language of section 6, if defendants were selling their labor, they were not engaged
“in commerce” within the meaning of the antitrust laws, and hence should not have been
covered whether or not they constituted a “labor organization.”  The text that would have
created their defense had long since been read out of the statute.
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the clear language of the statute.111  The Court then read the Sherman, Clay-
ton, and Norris-LaGuardia Acts in combination to immunize peaceable
union strikes from any form of remedy or liability, whether injunctive, crimi-
nal, or damages.112  But neither the Norris-LaGuardia nor Wagner Act over-
turned Apex Hosiery’s excision of the “commodity or article of commerce”
clause from section 6 of the Clayton Act,113 with the effect that the Clayton
Act’s sweeping removal of labor from antitrust’s purview remains a statutory
dead letter.  Congress, having insisted in the Clayton Act that human labor
categorically does not count as commerce subject to the antitrust laws, has
implicitly acquiesced in a long line of judicial decisions treating human labor
as ordinary commerce unless it falls within the purview of collective bargain-
ing–related activities.
2. Private Right of Action
Section 7 of the Sherman Act included a private right of action for treble
damages,114 a provision repeated with slight modifications in section 4 of the
Clayton Act.115  The operative words give the right of action to “any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or cor-
poration by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this
act.”116  Like the “every” in section 1 of the Sherman Act, the “any” in section
4 of the Clayton Act does not admit of textual qualification.  Straightfor-
wardly, any person injured in his or her business or property by a violation of
the antitrust laws should have a right of action for treble damages.
Undeterred by the statute’s plain meaning, the Supreme Court has
imposed two atextual limitations on the private right of action for treble dam-
ages.  The first, announced in 1977 in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., is the antitrust injury requirement: that “[p]laintiffs must prove . . .
injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows
111 Robert H. Lande & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An
Antitrust Solution, 46 DUKE L.J. 197, 205 (1996).
112 Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 236–37; Elinor R. Hoffmann, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Draw-
ing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 26–27 (1983).
113 Hoffmann, supra note 112, at 25.
114 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (amended 1914) (“Any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by
reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in
any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three fold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
115 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15)
(“That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
116 Sherman Act § 7 (amended 1914).
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from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”117  The second,
announced also in 1977 in Illinois Brick118 and continuing in a line of cases
on both purchaser standing and standing by other parties,119 denies standing
to parties who do not have a sufficiently direct connection to the violation.
In combination, these rules have the effect of denying a private right of
action for antitrust treble damages to a wide swath of parties who are quite
clearly “injured in [their] business or property”120 by virtue of antitrust
violations.
Neither the antitrust injury rule nor the standing rules could be, or
were, justified on textualist or legislative history grounds.  In Brunswick, the
Court found it odd to imagine that Congress meant “to mandate damages
awards for all dislocations caused by unlawful mergers despite the peculiar
consequences of so doing,” and found no support for such a result in section
4’s legislative history.121  But the most that can be said about the legislative
history of section 4 is that Congress meant the remedy to be broad and had
not fully considered the implications of giving standing to anyone suffering a
loss from an antitrust violation.122  There is no affirmative case in the legisla-
tive history to override the clear import of the statutory text.
As with respect to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court eventually came
to acknowledge that the glosses it wrote onto section 4 of the Clayton Act
could not be justified on textual grounds.123  Nonetheless, it has shown little
indication of interest in reviving a textual reading of section 4, with one
potential, recent exception:  In 2019, in Apple Inc. v. Pepper,124 Justice Kava-
naugh’s majority opinion finding that purchasers of Apple smartphone apps
were direct purchasers with standing to sue Apple purported to rely on statu-
tory textualism.  His opinion began with the text of section 4, quoted it with
“any person” italicized, and insisted that any ambiguity of in the Illinois Brick
line of precedents should be resolved “in the direction of the statutory
text.”125  And the Court granted antitrust standing to app purchasers, per-
117 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
118 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
119 See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 521, 543 (1983).
120 Clayton Act § 4.
121 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488.
122 Daniel Berger & Roger Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86
YALE L.J. 809, 811–12 (1977); C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies:
The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1997); Todd
Marcus Young, Note, Unestablished Businesses and Treble Damage Recovery Under Section Four of
the Clayton Act, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1076, 1082 (1982).
123 Holmes v. Secs. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992) (describing Court’s sec-
tion 4 jurisprudence as adopting a “judicial gloss that avoided a simple literal interpreta-
tion” (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 534)); Associated General Contractors,
459 U.S. at 529–31  (acknowledging that literal reading of statutory text would support
standing for plaintiffs and that, like section 1 of the Sherman Act, section 4 “cannot mean
what it says” (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978)).
124 139 S. Ct. 1514 (2019).
125 Id. at 1520, 1522.
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sons surely “injured in [their] business or property” under the plain meaning
of the statutory text.126  But while Apple could be seen as a textualist turn in
antitrust jurisprudence after a century of textual neglect, the case’s narrow
holding and the Court’s apparent lack of interest in revisiting the overall
structure of the Illinois Brick direct purchaser rule simply underscore the
Court’s general lack of interest in the statutory text of the antitrust law except
in limited and idiosyncratic cases.
Justice Kavanaugh’s weakly textualist gesture in Apple may reflect the
influence of conservative ideology on statutory interpretation, but to the dis-
advantage of big business.  As a general matter, no case could be made that
the Court’s reading down of section 4 and the private right of action reflects
the triumph of laissez-faire ideology.  The Supreme Court had few occasions
to interpret the private right of action created by section 4 until the post-War
period.127  When the Court began to layer atextual antitrust injury and stand-
ing requirements onto the statute in the 1970s, it hardly did so in a conven-
tionally ideological way.  The antitrust injury requirement was announced in
Brunswick by the civil rights veteran Justice Thurgood Marshall for a unani-
mous Court.128  The Court’s two other major antitrust injury decisions limit-
ing the scope of the private right of action under section 4 were authored by
the liberal lion Justice William Brennan.129  The Illinois Brick decision limit-
ing purchaser standing to seek treble damages to direct purchasers casts a
liberal-conservative shadow with Justice White writing for the more conserva-
tive members of the Court over dissents by Brennan, Marshall, and Black-
mun,130 but the Court later extended the direct injury rule to limit
nonpurchaser standing in an opinion by liberal Justice John Paul Stevens
over a single dissent by Justice Marshall.131
Here again, Congress has acquiesced through inaction.  The atextual
imposition of limitations on section 4’s private right of action—the antitrust
injury and standing requirements—have thus far gone unchallenged.
Although twenty-six states have responded with disapproval of the Supreme
Court’s Illinois Brick rule reserving standing to a direct purchaser,132 Con-
gress has let the ruling stand as to federal law.  Further, despite an invitation
to do so, the Court unanimously declined to constitutionalize its antitrust
standing doctrines, permitting the states to abrogate the federal rule at
126 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018)).
127 DANIEL A. CRANE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 51–56
(2011).
128 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S 477, 478, 489 (1977).
129 See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 331 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v.
Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 105, 111 (1986).
130 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 723, 748 (1977).
131 Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 520, 543, 546 (1983).
132 John C. Brinkerhoff Jr., Note, Ropes of Sand: State Antitrust Statutes Bound by Their
Original Scope, 34 YALE J. ON REGUL. 353, 376 & n.144 (2017) (listing the twenty-six state
“Illinois Brick Repealer” statutes (and District of Columbia’s ordinance)).
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will.133  Disregarding the statute’s plain language and legislative history, the
courts have treated antitrust’s private right of action as their common-law
turf, and Congress has acquiesced.
3. Tying and Exclusive Dealing
Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits firms to sell or lease goods
on the condition, agreement or understanding that the lessee or purchaser
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor
or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement or understanding may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.134
On its face, section 3 covers two species of anticompetitive behavior—exclu-
sive dealing contracts (where a firm requires its trading partners not to
purchase the good it is selling from a rival) and tying agreements (where a
seller requires its customers to purchase a secondary good from the seller if
they wish to purchase a primary good).  One immediately apparent textual
implication is that section 3 must be broader than section 1 of the Sherman
Act, otherwise there would be no need for it, since everything prohibited by
section 3 would already be prohibited by sections 1 and 2.  Textually, the
words “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”135
must have reference to standards of exclusion broader than those compre-
hended by sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act’s prohibitions on
“restraint[s] of trade” and “monopoliz[ing].”136
While recognizing the inevitable implications of the textual differences
between the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the courts have largely given these
implications feeble lip service only.  On the one hand, the courts have recog-
nized that, as to exclusive dealing and tying, the coverage of section 3 of the
Clayton Act must be broader than that of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  In
Times-Picayune, the Supreme Court suggested, in dicta, that section 3 might
apply if either the seller has power in the tying market or a substantial vol-
ume of commerce in the tied market is restrained, whereas both criteria
would have to be met to make out a section 1 claim.137  Likewise, in Tampa
Electric, the Court observed that, as to exclusive dealing contracts, section 3
has a “broader prescription” than section 1 of the Sherman Act.138  Lower
courts have interpreted this to mean that “a greater showing of anti-competi-
133 California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 94, 101 (1989) (holding state “Illinois
Brick Repealer laws” are not preempted by Supreme Court interpretations of Sherman
Act).
134 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 14).
135 Id.
136 Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–2).
137 Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608–09 (1953).
138 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 26 21-JAN-21 9:52
1230 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
tive effect is required to establish a Sherman Act violation than a § 3 Clayton
Act violation in exclusive-dealing or requirements contracts cases.”139  But
despite such dutiful recitations of a lower threshold of illegality in section 3
cases, the recitation is functionally a dead letter.  In practice, courts uni-
formly apply the same standards for tying under the Clayton and Sherman
Acts.140
Moreover, the courts have functionally inverted the textual weight of the
Clayton Act’s concern with exclusive dealing or tying agreements “tend[ing]
to create a monopoly”141 and section 2 of the Sherman Act’s concern with
persons that “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize.”142  Whereas a person
has not “monopolized” unless she has actually obtained a monopoly and has
not “attempted to monopolize” unless she has had a specific intent to
monopolize and come dangerously close,143 textually conduct might “tend”
toward monopoly without having yet completed the act or being specifically
meant to do so.  But courts hold just the opposite, permitting claims under
section 2 of the Sherman Act to proceed after rejecting claims under section
139 Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir.
1975); accord CDC Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Lab’ys, Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1999)
(observing that a greater degree of market foreclosure would be required in a Sherman
Act case than in a Clayton Act section 3 case); Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O.
Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 n.9 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[A] greater showing of anticompe-
titive effect is required to establish a Sherman Act violation than a section 3 Clayton Act
violation in exclusive-dealing cases.”).
140 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 218 n.22 (2d ed. 2004) (collecting cases).  While
there is a division of authority in the lower courts as to whether, in principle, the amount
of market foreclosure necessary to make out a section 3 exclusive dealing claim is lower
than in a comparable Sherman Act case, id.; see also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253
F.3d 34, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (collecting cases), the distinction turns out to be functionally
irrelevant since, as a practical matter, exclusive dealing claims are evaluated “under the
same rule of reason” whether arising under the Sherman or Clayton Act.  ZF Meritor, LLC
v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 281 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141,
157 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)).  Where a plaintiff asserts both section 3 and section
1 claims, the courts’ usual practice is to dispose solely of the section 3 claim and then
declare that whatever it decided as to that claim also controls the section 1 claim. See, e.g.,
Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1233 n.16 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The parties did
not extensively address the Section 1 claim in this appeal, but our resolution of the Clayton
Act claim disposes of the issue.”).  Often, courts formulaically recite the difference between
the Clayton Act and Sherman Act standards, and then move on with their analysis without
any further attention to statutory differences. See, e.g., Eastman v. Quest Diagnostics Inc.,
724 Fed. App’x. 556, 558 (9th Cir. 2018).  Where a party asserts just a section 1 claim, the
analysis is, in practice, no different.
141 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 14).
142 Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–2).
143 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993).
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3 of the Clayton Act.144  As with section 1 of the Sherman Act, the courts
have essentially subsumed section 3’s antimonopoly language into section 2
of the Sherman Act’s antimonopoly provision, even though section 3 textu-
ally has an evidently broader scope.
The Clayton Act’s legislative history does not provide support for abne-
gation of the statutory text either.  Arguing to the contrary, the Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise dismisses the possibility that section 3 of the Clayton Act
must be given a broader scope of operation than the Sherman Act, observing
that “the Clayton Act was enacted not because Congress was sure that the
Sherman Act would not cover the same ground but because Congress was
uncertain about the coverage of that statute after the Standard Oil case
promulgated the vague ‘rule of reason.’”145  But a closer look at the Clayton
Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress was concerned not merely with
the uncertainty created by Standard Oil’s adoption of the rule of reason, but
with more particular implications of Supreme Court precedent on tying.
After the Clayton bill had passed the House, the Senate struck the provision
that became section 3 (dealing with tying and exclusive dealing contracts) on
the ground that such provisions could be addressed by the Federal Trade
Commission under the then-pending FTC bill.146  Senator Reed of Missouri
successfully urged reconsideration,147 on the grounds that the FTC would be
unlikely to outlaw agreements of the type the Supreme Court had upheld in
the A.B. Dick148 case in 1912.  Section 3 was thus directed not just against a
vague rule of reason, but against the particular doctrine of A.B. Dick, as the
Supreme Court subsequently held.149  Yet while the Court’s tying jurispru-
dence, under both the Clayton and Sherman Acts, reflected hostility toward
tying arrangements from the 1920s to the 1970s, tying law subsequently
swung back to a much more receptive view to tying,150 including resurrecting
a number of doctrinal points enunciated in A.B. Dick.151  As the courts
144 LePage’s Inc., 324 F.3d at 157 n.10; Barr Lab’ys, Inc. v. Abbott Lab’ys, 978 F.2d 98,
110–12 (3d Cir.1992); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1092 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), aff’d, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978).
145 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, at 216.
146 See 51 CONG. REC. 14,088–92 (1914); see also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 297 n.4 (1949) (recounting legislative history of section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act).
147 Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 297 n.4.
148 Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 14, 48, 49 (1912).
149 Motion Picture Pats. Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 (1917) (hold-
ing that A.B. Dick “must be regarded as overruled”).
150 Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 35 (2006) (“Over the years,
however, this Court’s strong disapproval of tying arrangements has substantially
diminished.”).
151 These included: (1) the exclusive rights granted by Congress through the patent
system are not the type of monopolies with which the antitrust laws are concerned, compare
A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 27–28 (explaining that patent monopolies are not those attacked by
antitrust laws), with Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 31 (abrogating post–A.B. Dick precedents hold-
ing that presence of a patent in tying market creates conclusive presumption of market
power for antitrust purposes); (2) tying arrangements are not harmful to competition if
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reformed the law to be much more lenient toward tying, they treated the
question almost entirely as one of antitrust common law rather than inquir-
ing into the text or legislative history of section 3 of the Clayton Act.  Typical
is Justice Blackmun’s statement in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co.
that A.B. Dick provoked “what may be characterized through the lens of hind-
sight as an inevitable judicial reaction,” followed by an acknowledgment in a
footnote that “[i]n addition to this judicial reaction, there was legislative
reaction as well.”152  In antitrust cases, the courts tend to treat judicial com-
mon law as text and statutes as footnotes.
There is no clear moment when section 3’s distinctive prohibitions on
tying and exclusive dealing were subsumed within the Court’s Sherman Act
jurisprudence; it occurred accretively in a succession of decisions.  But this
much is clear:  The shift of judicial attitude toward tying and exclusive deal-
ing that resulted in the weakening of section 3 did not come about primarily
as a judicial putsch from the right.  Justice Stevens’s opinions for unanimous
Courts153 in Fortner II,154 Jefferson Parish,155 and Independent Ink156 did as
much to resurrect A.B.  Dick’s treatment of tying as any decision.157  And it
was Justice Clark’s 1961 opinion for seven Justices in Tampa Electric, at a time
when the Court could not plausibly be thought conservative on antitrust
issues, that created the template for contemporary, economically informed
exclusive dealing analysis under section 3.158
they only affect the sales of the tied product when used with the tying product and not the
general market, compare A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 31–32 (explaining that tying arrangement in
question only affected sales in relevant market relating to use of defendant’s mimeograph
machines), with Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 41–43; (3) a patentee might lawfully decide to sell
his patented goods at cost and take his profits from higher prices in the tied market, com-
pare A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. at 32 (explaining that A.B. Dick had pursued such a strategy), with
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 478–79 (1992) (acknowledg-
ing that “[a] pricing strategy based on lower equipment prices and higher aftermarket
prices could enhance equipment sales by making it easier for the buyer to finance the
initial purchase” and that such a strategy would not violate the antitrust laws, although
declining to decide whether that efficiency explanation was justified on the facts of Kodak).
152 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 191 & n.10 (1980).
153 All three opinions were unanimous in the judgment, although there were concur-
ring opinions in Fortner II and Jefferson Parish.
154 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977)
(departing from Supreme Court holdings that tying arrangements are almost always ille-
gal). See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305–06 (1949)
(“Tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.”).
155 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 4–5 (1984).
156 Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 28, 45.
157 While Fortner II, Jefferson Parish, and Independent Ink arose only under the Sherman
Act, the Court’s Independent Ink opinion lumped tying cases arising under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act, section 5 of the FTC Act, or section 3 of the Clayton Act into a single
analytical bucket. Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 34–35; see also Indep. Ink, 547 U.S. at 32; Jefferson
Par., 466 U.S. at 4; Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 611.
158 See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961); Harlan M.
Blake & William K. Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
422, 453 (1965) (describing Tampa Electric as requiring inquiry into whether “effective
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Further, while Congress has shown interest in tying as a question of pat-
ent misuse and on several occasions overturned Supreme Court precedents
interpreting the patent statute,159 it has undertaken no intervention to over-
ride the Court’s atextual interpretations weakening section 3 of the Clayton
Act.  As with the balance of the antitrust statutes, Congress has acquiesced in
the courts’ treatment of the Clayton Act as their common-law domain,
despite having said, and apparently meant, something quite different than
that at the time of the statute’s passage.
C. Federal Trade Commission Act
The companion statute to the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, articulated the most comprehensive and succinct antitrust rule
imaginable: “Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce . . .
are hereby declared unlawful.”160  It is admittedly difficult to glean much
meaning from a plain reading of the statutory text, but one thing is readily
apparent—section 5 of the FTC Act is concerned with business ethics; it pros-
cribes “unfair” methods of competition.  It is also textually apparent that sec-
tion 5 is more open-textured and general than sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act, and therefore that section 5 must prohibit everything that the
Sherman Act prohibits, and more.  Thus, for example, the textual prohibi-
tion on “unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce” facially
does not require any general market effect of the kind facially required by
section 2 of the Sherman Act (monopoly) or read into section 1 of the Sher-
man Act (market power).  An unfair competitive act is simply illegal.
Section 5’s legislative history confirms the textual inferences that Con-
gress was chiefly concerned with policing practices inconsistent with business
morality.  Senator Newlands, a leading proponent of the bill, argued for a
catchall phrase like “unfair methods of competition” because
“it would be utterly impossible for Congress to define the numerous prac-
tices which constitute unfair competition and which are against good morals
in trade.”  Unfair competition “covers every practice and method between
competitors upon the part of one against the other that is against public
functioning of the market is [ ] threatened and where the transaction promotes economic
efficiency”).
159 Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1–390) (excluding some conduct, such as a tying arrangement involving the sale of a
patented product tied to an essential or nonstaple product that has no use except as part
of the patented product or method, from scope of patent misuse); Act of Nov. 19, 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-703, 102 Stat. 4676 (eliminating presumption that patents used to tie con-
fer market power).
160 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2018).  The 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendments added a prohibi-
tion on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”  Wheeler-Lea Act of March 21, 1938, Pub. L.
No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111.
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morals . . . or is an offense for which a remedy lies either at law or in
equity.”161
When another Senator objected that “ ‘public morals’” was a “‘pretty broad
category,’” Senator Newlands doubled down on public morals being “a very
good test.”162  In the House, Representative Covington, a key bill proponent,
explained that “the term may be said now to embrace those unjust, dishon-
est, and inequitable practices by which one seeks to destroy or injure the
business of a competitor.”163  Proponents of the bill argued that “unfair
methods of competition” were not restricted to firms with market power; for
instance, a small firm that employed industrial espionage would equally have
violated the statute.164
Unavoidably, the courts recognized that the Commission’s powers under
section 5 are at least coextensive with the substantive reach of the Sherman
Act—in other words, that anything that is illegal under the Sherman Act is
also illegal under the FTC Act.165  The Supreme Court also held that the
FTC may go further than the Sherman Act and “stop in their incipiency acts
and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts.”166  Thus,
“[t]he standard of ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act . . . encompass[es] not
only practices that violate the Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws . . .
but also practices that the Commission determines are against public policy
for other reasons.”167  So far, so good, for textual interpretation.
However, the pro forma recognition that the FTC Act must be broader
than the Sherman Act has not resulted in an operationally wider scope for
the FTC Act than the Sherman Act.  Once again, judicial resistance contrib-
uted to the reading down of the statute.  In a series of cases in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the federal courts of appeal rejected the FTC’s efforts to
assert an independent section 5 jurisprudence that would capture trade prac-
tices not unlawful under the Sherman Act.168  After taking its licking in the
courts, the FTC largely fell back on bringing conventional Sherman Act
cases, essentially tying the meaning of the FTC Act to the judicial interpreta-
161 Stephen Calkins, FTC Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1935, 1945 (2000)
(alteration in original) (quoting Senate Consideration (H.R. 15613; S. 4160), in 5 THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 3936, 3968
(Earl W. Kintner ed., 1982) [hereinafter KINTER]).
162 Id. (quoting Senate Consideration (H.R. 15613; S. 4160), supra note 161, at 4414).
163 Id. at 1946–47 (quoting Conference Consideration (H.R. 15613), in KINTNER, supra
note 161, at 4726).
164 Id. at 1946 (citing Senate Consideration (H.R. 15613; S. 4160), supra note 161, at
4141, 4135, 4146).
165 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948).
166 FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) (quoting FTC v. Motion Picture
Advert. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394–95 (1953)).
167 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).
168 E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 577–81 (9th Cir. 1980); Off. Airline Guides, Inc. v.
FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 921 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tion of the Sherman Act.169  In recent years, the Commission has cautiously
(and controversially) tried to recapture the possibility of an independent
“unfair methods of competition” jurisprudence, but thus far there is no indi-
cation of whether the courts will go along.170
One striking consequence of the jurisprudential melding of the FTC
and Sherman Acts has been the complete excision of the word “unfair” from
section 5.  Since the rise of the consumer welfare standard in the late 1970s,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act in amoral terms, as a
purely consequentialist statute aimed at maximizing economic efficiency.171
As the leading antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp has put it, “antitrust has
no moral content”172 and its “sole purpose is to make the economy big-
ger.”173  As a positive description of current U.S. antitrust doctrine, that
observation is correct.  The Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to
explain that the antitrust laws do not remedy purely immoral acts between
competitors, even acts “of pure malice” among competitors.174  Note the
excision of “unfair competition” from antitrust in the canonical statement of
this principle from Brooke Group:
Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does
not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws
do not create a federal law of unfair competition or “purport to afford reme-
dies for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate
commerce.”175
Perhaps this is a plausible reading of the Sherman Act, which does not
use morally loaded terminology, but that statement could not apply textually
to section 5 of the FTC Act, which begins with the words “unfair methods of
competition.”  Nonetheless, in coupling the meaning of section 5 with the
meaning of the Sherman Act, the courts have excised the entire phrase
169 CRANE, supra note 127, at 136.
170 FED. TRADE COMM’N, STATEMENT OF ENFORCEMENT PRINCIPLES REGARDING “UNFAIR
METHODS OF COMPETITION” UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT (Aug. 13, 2015), https://
www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/08/statement-enforcement-principles-regarding-
unfair-methods-competition; Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2009 WL 4999728 (F.T.C. Dec. 16,
2009) (Statement of Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch).
171 Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 563–66 (2012)
(collecting cases showing federal courts’ commitment to consumer welfare and economic
efficiency).
172 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28 J. CORP. L. 607, 609
(2003) (“[A]ntitrust has no moral content and is unconcerned about the distribution of
wealth.”); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECU-
TION 10, 54 (2005) (same).
173 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Innovation: Where We Are and Where We Should Be
Going, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 749, 750 (2011) (“Neither antitrust nor intellectual property law
has any moral content.  Their sole purpose is to make the economy bigger.”).
174 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993);
see also NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (warning against transform-
ing “cases involving business behavior that is improper for various reasons, say, cases involv-
ing nepotism or personal pique, into treble-damages antitrust cases”).
175 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225 (quoting Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945)).
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“unfair methods of competition”—which is the only operational idea in sec-
tion 5—from the statute.  For example, in rejecting the FTC’s challenge to
Rambus’s exploitation of patents that were not disclosed to a standard setting
organization, the D.C. Circuit held that deceptive conduct to thwart competi-
tors that does not harm competition generally is not actionable under the
FTC Act, and then cited Brooke Group’s “pure malice” language in support.176
Even courts that uphold FTC challenges to anticompetitive behavior insist
that the action can succeed only if the Commission can prove general market
effects, and not merely wrongful acts harming a competitor,177 and that FTC
cases are tried “in the court of consumer welfare.”178  “Unfair,” pregnant
with morality, has been read entirely out of the statute as to antitrust cases
and replaced with the consequentialist jurisprudence of neoclassical
economics.
But, again, the judicial transformation of the FTC Act away from its text
and original purpose cannot be read in primarily left/right ideological
terms.  The excision of fairness and morality from the “unfair methods of
competition” text of section 5 of the FTC Act has been accomplished in a
succession of judicial decisions and with the implicit consent of the Commis-
sion itself.  The Supreme Court’s unanimous 1931 Raladam decision limited
section 5’s coverage to acts that harmed specific competitors or competition
generally, which removed from section 5’s coverage deceptive or oppressive
acts that harmed consumers without harming competitors.179 Congress fixed
this gap in 1938 with the Wheeler-Lea Amendments, which granted the Com-
mission explicit power to enjoin “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” even
if they did not harm competition or consumers.180  Functionally, this new
grant of power gave the Commission a consumer protection mission separate
from its antitrust mission, but the two missions always played in concert.
Excessive adventurism by the Commission in its consumer protection mission
in the 1970s that led to social and political backlash, coupled with the conser-
vatism of the Reagan years and defeats in the lower courts in a few antitrust
cases,181 moved the Commission to adopt a cautious stance in its enforce-
176 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Deceptive conduct—like
any other kind—must have an anticompetitive effect in order to form the basis of a
monopolization claim.  ‘Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against
another does not, without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws,’ without
proof of ‘a dangerous probability that [the defendant] would monopolize a particular mar-
ket.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225)).
177 E.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 835 (11th Cir. 2015) (observing that “the
government must demonstrate that the defendant’s challenged conduct had anticompeti-
tive effects, harming competition”); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32–33
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (observing that Commission must show harm to competition or output
reduction).
178 Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37.
179 FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 652–54 (1931).
180 Wheeler-Lea Act of March 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111; see also CRANE,
supra note 127, at 138; Calkins, supra note 161, at 1949–50.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 168–69.
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ment actions.  If the Commission tied its antitrust enforcement actions to the
same Sherman Act jurisprudence applicable to the Justice Department and
private litigants, the Commission could hardly be accused of regulatory impe-
rialism.  Thus, the reading out of unfairness from section 5 did not happen
principally or solely due to conservative judicial construction of the statute,
but due to a confluence of judicial, legislative, and administrative decisions
over the course of decades.
With one exception, Congress has also acquiesced through inaction in
the courts’ progressive excision of fairness and ethics from the FTC Act’s
prohibition on “unfair methods of competition.”  As noted earlier, the 1938
Wheeler-Lea Amendments, which created the FTC’s mandate to enjoin
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” came about in reaction to the
Supreme Court’s Raladam decision holding section 5 inapplicable to conduct
unharmful to competition or competitors.182  But the effect of the amend-
ment was to create new consumer protection authority for the Commission
separate from its antitrust mission, leaving the antitrust mission to the mercy
of previous and future judicial interpretation.  As subsequent courts gutted
section 5 of its textually distinctive moral and ethical meaning and tied the
FTC Act functionally to consequentialist judicial interpretations of the Sher-
man Act, Congress showed no interest in an override.
If an antitrust statute ever made an ample target for a constitutional
challenge, it was section 5 of the FTC Act, which drips with vagueness in its
prohibition of “unfair methods of competition.”  Although the Supreme
Court sometimes alluded to generalized liberty interests in its construction of
the FTC Act,183 the vagueness issue has not squarely reached the Supreme
Court.  The Seventh Circuit upheld the statute against a void for vagueness
challenge184 and the Supreme Court embraced the enterprise of deciding
the statute’s coverage on a case-by-case basis.185  The Supreme Court then
upheld the independence of the agency from the executive branch,186 per-
mitting section 5 jurisprudence and enforcement to float free from the Presi-
dent’s enforcement of the Sherman Act.  When the court iteratively read
unfairness and business ethics out of the statute and aligned section 5 atextu-
ally with the Sherman Act, it did so without constitutional leverage or
overtones.
182 Supra note 170.
183 See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Refin. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475–76 (1923) (“The powers of the
Commission are limited by the statutes.  It has no general authority to compel competitors
to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods or to prescribe arbitrary
standards for those engaged in the conflict for advantage called competition.  The great
purpose of both statutes was to advance the public interest by securing fair opportunity for
the play of the contending forces ordinarily engendered by an honest desire for gain.  And
to this end it is essential that those who adventure their time, skill and capital should have
large freedom of action in the conduct of their own affairs.”).
184 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307, 310–12 (7th Cir. 1919).
185 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
186 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
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D. Robinson-Patman Act
Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibited sellers “to discriminate in price
between different purchasers of commodities . . . where the effect of such
discrimination may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.”187  The rise of large chain stores like
the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company (“A&P”) around the time of the
First World War and the pressure they put on “mom and pop” retail stores
led to a populist push for amendments to the Clayton Act that would tighten
the prohibition on price discrimination.188  In particular, critics argued that
chain stores were able to leverage their buyer power to obtain bulk discounts
from suppliers and then undercut the retail prices offered by smaller inde-
pendent stores.189  In 1936, Congress passed the Robinson-Patman Act to
add further prohibitions to section 2 of the Clayton Act.  Reflecting the pre-
vailing view that chain store buyers were often the culprits in obtaining vol-
ume discounts, the Robinson-Patman Act made buyers liable if they
“knowingly . . . induce or receive” a discriminatory price prohibited by the
Act.190  Further, and most significantly for textualist purposes, the Act added
to the “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” crite-
ria an additional category of cognizable competitive harms for price discrimi-
nation that tends to “injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or
with customers of either of them.”191  The evident purpose of this addition
was to create liability in circumstances where the discriminatory price might
not have a general market effect but might nonetheless impair the ability of
some rival to compete with the firm giving the discriminatory price or a firm
receiving it.192  Textually, “lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”
have reference to general market effects, whereas the focus on injury to com-
petition with a particular person made the new Robinson-Patman criterion
personal to individual market actors.  As Herbert Hovenkamp has noted,
“[n]othing in the statute required an injury to competition in the economic
sense, which would be lower output or higher prices.”193
From early days of judicial interpretation, the courts worried that the
Robinson-Patman Act could be “viewed as an act of Congressional schizo-
187 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730, 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a)).
188 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Robinson-Patman Act: A New Deal for Small Business, in
REGULATORY CHANGE IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF CRISIS: CURRENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ROOSEVELT YEARS 63, 66 (Gary M. Walton ed., 1979).
189 See id. at 66.
190 Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, § 2, 49 Stat. 1526, 1527 (1936) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)).
191 Id. § 2, 49 Stat. at 1526 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)).
192 Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., 111 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1997); Herbert
Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J.
125, 133–34 (2000) (collecting precedents, although disagreeing with them).
193 Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 83 (2018).
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phrenia, an anti-competitive island situated in an otherwise turbulent sea of
pro-competitive efficiency and maximization of consumer welfare, the
hallmarks of the Nation’s antitrust laws” and hinted that the Act might have
to be judicially harmonized with broader currents of the antitrust laws.194
From the New Deal to the 1970s, the Robinson-Patman Act was vigorously
enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department, and pri-
vate litigants.  But the Act eventually fell out of favor with the agencies.  The
Justice Department last brought a Robinson-Patman case in 1977 and the
FTC stopped bringing cases in the 1980s.195  This abdication of enforcement
by the federal antitrust agencies left the contestation over interpretation of
the Act to private litigants.
Reflecting rising hostility to the Robinson-Patman Act among econo-
mists, academics, and the antitrust establishment, the courts moved to bring
the statute’s interpretation in line with the establishment’s preferences.196
Textually, the Robinson-Patman Act makes unlawful discriminatory discounts
that harm competition at the level of the firm granting the discriminatory
price (“primary line”) or those receiving it (“secondary line”).197  In Brooke
Group, the Supreme Court announced that cases of primary-line price dis-
crimination would require the same showing as a plaintiff would have to
make in a predatory pricing case under section 2 of the Sherman Act—pric-
ing below an appropriate measure of cost and a dangerous probability of
recoupment through the imposition of supracompetitive prices.198  The
Court cast all primary-line Robinson-Patman cases in the consumer-welfare
model: “That below-cost pricing may impose painful losses on its target is of
no moment to the antitrust laws if competition is not injured: It is axiomatic
that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition, not com-
petitors.’”199  This assertion is flatly contrary to the plain text and legislative
history of the Robinson-Patman Act, which protects the competitor regard-
less of effects on competition more generally.
Textually, there is no reason to interpret the competitive harm require-
ment in a primary-line case differently than in a secondary-line case, since in
either case the statutory language of the third prong focuses on injury to a
person rather than to the market.  However, some lower courts reacted to
Brooke Group by holding that the third (Robinson-Patman Act) proviso
applies only in secondary-line cases.200  Such an approach would have the
194 Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
195 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 579 (3d ed. 2005).
196 See generally Harry Ballan, Note, The Courts’ Assault on the Robinson-Patman Act, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 634 (1992).
197 DANIEL A. CRANE, ANTITRUST 129 (2014).
198 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222–24
(1993).
199 Id. at 224 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
200 See, e.g., George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 148 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir.
1998); Chroma Lighting v. GTE Prods. Corp., 111 F.3d 653, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1997);
Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1272–73 (3d Cir. 1995);
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 36 21-JAN-21 9:52
1240 notre dame law review [vol. 96:3
arguable virtue of rescuing secondary-line cases from the reach of Brooke
Group, but it is not textually sustainable to limit the reach of the third proviso
to secondary-line cases, since the proviso applies to competition with persons
whether they “grant” or “receive” a discriminatory discount, thus compre-
hending both primary and secondary-line cases.201  In any event, the
Supreme Court largely abrogated this possibility in Reeder-Simco, holding in a
secondary-line case (citing Brooke Group) that the Robinson-Patman Act
should be interpreted “consistently with broader policies of the antitrust
laws” and that “ ‘we would resist interpretation geared more to the protection
of existing competitors than to the stimulation of competition.’”202Following
Reeder-Simco, the Robinson-Patman proviso has been essentially read out of
the statute as to both primary- and secondary-line cases.203  The Third Circuit
summed up the implication of Reeder-Simco with the observation that “the
RPA should be narrowly construed,”204 which is surely not what Congress
had in mind in 1936.  A statutory amendment that was designed to expand
the Clayton Act’s price discrimination prohibition beyond general market
harms has been interpreted to require proof of general market harms.  Pre-
vailing Robinson-Patman Act jurisprudence would be unrecognizable to the
Congress that passed the Act.
Although Chicago School consumer welfarism contributed to the Robin-
son-Patman Act’s ultimate demise, it would be anachronistic to pin the blame
primarily on conservative economic views.  The Act fell into disfavor among
the antitrust establishment within two decades of its passage, long before Chi-
cago had made an appreciable mark on the courts, academy, or antitrust
establishment.  Beginning with the 1955 Report of the Attorney General’s
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, a succession of bipartisan com-
missions called the Act into question.  The 1955 Committee called on the
courts to interpret the Act consistently with the “broader antitrust policies”
and “accommodat[e] all legal restrictions on the distribution process to dom-
Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995); J.F. Feeser, Inc. v.
Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1533 (3d Cir. 1990).
201 Hovenkamp, supra note 192, at 135 (“[T]he plain language of the statute makes
clear that this interpretation is incorrect.  Secondary-line injury is the injury suffered by a
firm that must compete with someone who receives the benefit of a price discrimination.  In
such cases, the disfavored purchaser is injured to the extent it must compete with the
favored purchaser’s lower price.  By contrast, primary-line injury is the injury suffered by a
firm that competes with someone who grants the benefit of such discrimination.  In that
case the injured firm is the rival competing in the defendant’s low-price market.  In sum,
the provision that was added in 1936, with its more aggressive injury standard, was clearly
intended to apply to both  primary- and secondary-line situations.” (footnote omitted)).
202 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181 (2006)
(quoting Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 220).
203 See, e.g., Cash & Henderson Drugs, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 799 F.3d 202, 213 (2d
Cir. 2015) (rejecting secondary-line Robinson-Patman case for failure to show harm to
competition generally); Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204,
227–28 (3d Cir. 2008); Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854,
864 (6th Cir. 2007).
204 Toledo Mack Sales, 530 F.3d at 227.
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inant Sherman Act policies,”205 and the 1968–69 Neal Report opined that
“the Robinson-Patman Act requires a major overhaul to make it consistent
with the purposes of the antitrust laws.”206  In 1977, President Carter’s Justice
Department called for “serious consideration” to be given to repealing the
Robinson-Patman Act,207 and the 2007 bipartisan and congressionally
appointed Antitrust Modernization Commission called outright for the Act’s
repeal.208  It was against a background of rising bipartisan dissatisfaction with
the Act that the Supreme Court’s Brooke Group decision jettisoned the juris-
prudence of the more textually faithful Utah Pie209 opinion and rolled pri-
mary-line cases into Sherman Act section 2 jurisprudence.210  The Court split
6–3 along conventional ideological lines in Brooke Group, with the conserva-
tives in the majority and the liberals in dissent.211  However, the ideological
contest in Brooke Group was not about whether the Robinson-Patman Act
should require a showing of likely harm to competition (as opposed to spe-
cific competitors)—a proposition accepted by Justice Stevens’s dissent212—
but rather over the plausibility of predatory pricing and recoupment.  Any
doubt over whether the judicial excision of the “with any person” statutory
prong should be understood in conventional ideological terms was put to
rest with Justice Ginsburg’s Reeder-Simco secondary-line opinion for seven Jus-
tices (over a dissent by Justice Stevens joined by Justice Thomas), calling for
the Robinson-Patman Act to be harmonized with the remainder of the anti-
trust laws.213
Congress has done nothing to check this apparent judicial insubordina-
tion.  The Robinson-Patman Act was a reform statute, but its target was not
disapproved judicial interpretations of section 2 of the Clayton Act, but
rather changing economic circumstances—the rise of the chain store.214
When the courts began disregarding the statute’s plain meaning and legisla-
tive intent in the 1980s and rolling the statute into Sherman Act jurispru-
dence advancing a consumer-welfare standard, Congress looked on with
either approval or disinterest.
205 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 132 (1955).
206 PHIL C. NEAL ET AL., REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POL-
ICY, reprinted in ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Winter 1968–69, at 11, 41.
207 DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
260–61 (1977).
208 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 312 (2007).
209 Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702–03 (1967).
210 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 (1993).
211 Id. at 211.
212 Id. at 253 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In this case, then, Liggett need not show any
actual harm to competition, but only the reasonable possibility that such harm would flow
from B&W’s conduct.”).
213 Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 168, 181
(2006).
214 Supra text accompanying note 188.
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E. Clayton Act Section 7 and the Celler-Kefauver Amendments
The most recent substantive amendment to the antitrust laws arrived in
1950 with the passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act, which amended section 7 of
the Clayton Act to strengthen the prohibition on anticompetitive mergers
and arrest the “rising tide of economic concentration” of the post-War Ameri-
can economy.215  Among other things, the Act clarified that section 7
reached “incipient” trends toward increasing concentration levels which
might threaten competition with a view to “arrest[ing] restraints of trade in
their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints violative
of the Sherman Act.”216
The story of judicial interpretation of the Celler-Kefauver Act and its
relevance to this Article’s antitextualism narrative is complicated by subse-
quent statutory and institutional developments.  Between 1950 and the mid-
1970s, the Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission aggressively
pursued an antimerger agenda.  The courts largely rubber-stamped their
actions, leading to Justice Stewart’s lament in 1966 that “[t]he sole consis-
tency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always
wins.”217  By the mid-1970s, the Chicago School’s challenge to the structural-
ist paradigm, which undergirded the economic theories opposing mergers,
had begun to prevail, and a new generation of judges and antitrust lawyers
were becoming skeptical of aggressive antimerger enforcement.  However,
the shift in policy did not occur primarily in the courts, but rather in the
antitrust enforcement agencies.  This was due to the passage of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act of 1976, which created a system of premerger notification
that shifted the locus of decisionmaking on most contestable mergers from
the courts to the antitrust agencies.218  As a result, the big shift from aggres-
sive to less aggressive antimerger enforcement occurred primarily as the
agencies brought fewer antitrust cases rather than because of any interpreta-
tive shift by the courts.
Still, judicial interpretation of section 7 has played a role in the shift
away from aggressive antimerger enforcement in two significant ways.  First,
although continuing to pay lip service to the “incipiency” standard pregnant
in the language of the statute, the courts have increasingly held the govern-
ment to the burden of proving probable harm to competition in the form of
higher prices.  As courts have at times noted, the qualifiers “may be” and
“tend to” in “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
215 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962).  The Act was also
intended to serve political purposes, including preventing levels of economic concentra-
tion that had fueled the rise of fascism in Europe and could facilitate the rise of commu-
nism.  Daniel A. Crane, Fascism and Monopoly, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1324 (2020).
216 Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 n.39 (quoting S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 6 (1950) (Conf.
Rep.)).
217 United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
218 CRANE, supra note 127, at 72, 103–04.
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monopoly”219 suggest that the government should bear a lesser burden of
probabilistic proof than if the statute required that the merger in question
“substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly.”220  But, while con-
tinuing to recite the incipiency standard, the courts have shifted away from
prohibiting mergers that move the market toward greater concentration even
if they have no immediate anticompetitive effect to requiring the govern-
ment to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the merger will result
in higher prices or reduced output.221  For instance, in AT&T/Time Warner,
the D.C. Circuit held that the government’s prima facie case requires a “ ‘fact-
specific’ showing that the proposed merger is ‘likely to be anticompetitive’”
and dismissed the government’s case for failing to meet that showing.222
What the court meant by an “anticompetitive effect” was evident from the
focus of its opinion—whether the merger would result in increased prices to
consumers.223  Other recent merger decisions have similarly required the
government to prove the likelihood that the merger will result in higher
prices or reduced output.224
If the government bears the burden of proving that the merger will
likely lead to price increases, the words “may be” and “tend to” are doing no
distinctive work in the text of section 7.  In any civil case, the plaintiff does
not have to prove certainties, but bears only the burden of proving the facts
supporting liability by a preponderance of the evidence—likelihood.  This
would be the government or a private plaintiff’s burden in a Sherman Act
case.  The text and legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act make clear
that Congress did not want the FTC or Justice Department to have to prove
the likelihood of price effects to the certainty standards of a Sherman Act
case,225 but under current caselaw there is no discernable difference in the
219 Robinson-Patman Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, § 2, 49 Stat. 1526, 1526 (1936) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)).
220 Peter C. Carstensen & Robert H. Lande, The Merger Incipiency Doctrine and the Impor-
tance of “Redundant” Competitors, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 783, 792–94.
221 United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“[T]he Government has the burden of proof and seeks to: (1) define the relevant product
market; (2) define the relevant geographic market; and (3) prove that the merger will be
anti-competitive and will result in an increase in prices above competitive levels for a signif-
icant period of time.”).
222 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Joint
Statement on the Burden of Proof at Trial at 3–4, United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp.
3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-cv-02511)).
223 Id. at 1036 (focusing on evidence that merger would result in “net price increases to
consumers”).
224 See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 719 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (observing that
Commission does not bear the burden of proving likely price increases with certainty, but
only with reasonable probability); United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 992
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting government’s challenge to merger where defendant’s counter-
evidence suggested that merger would not lead to price increases); Hosp. Corp. of Am. v.
FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986) (same).
225 See supra note 216.
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operational burden of proof standards in Sherman Act and Clayton Act
cases.
Second, the courts have rejected a number of government merger chal-
lenges for failure to meet the strict requirement of proving a relevant geo-
graphic or product market.226  But the statutory language—“in any line of
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the coun-
try”227—was not meant to require technical market definition.  As the
Supreme Court noted in Brown Shoe, the legislative history of the Celler-
Kefauver Act makes clear that Congress wished to avoid “exclusively mathe-
matical tests” in determining whether mergers had undesirable effects on
commerce.228  Reflecting the statutory text and history, cases decided in the
1950s and ’60s held that section 7 cases did not require formal relevant mar-
ket definition of the kind required in Sherman Act cases, and that any prod-
uct with “peculiar characteristics and uses” was a line of commerce within the
meaning of section 7.229  Whether or not sound as a matter of economic
analysis and policy, this approach was surely more faithful to the text, legisla-
tive history, and spirit of the Clayton and Celler-Kefauver Acts than an
approach requiring the government to bear the difficult burden of proving a
relevant market employing the technical cross-elasticity of demand test char-
acteristic of Sherman Act cases.230
The federal courts undoubtedly became more pro-business in merger
cases in the wake of the Chicago School revolution of the late 1970s, but the
antitextual turns in merger law—abrogation of the incipiency standard and
insistence on formal market definition using the cross-elasticity of demand
test—are not primarily attributable to the advent of Chicago School ideology.
The Justice Department’s equation of “line of commerce” and “section of the
country” with market definition began with its promulgation of the first Hori-
zontal Merger Guidelines in 1968.231  The same guidelines called for accord-
ing “primary significance” to the market shares of the acquiring and acquired
firms in horizontal merger analysis, as well as considering the concentration
226 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1239–40, 1243 (8th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Tenet
Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1051–53 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Engelhard
Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305, 1308 (11th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260,
271–72 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175–76 (N.D.
Cal. 2004); United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 978–87 (N.D. Iowa
1995).
227 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2018).
228 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321 n.36 (1962).
229 Note, Product Market Definition Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 110 U. PA. L. REV.
861, 871–72 (1962) (collecting cases).
230 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 887, 890–91
(2012); J. Douglas Richards, Is Market Definition Necessary in Sherman Act Cases When Anticom-
petitive Effects Can Be Shown with Direct Evidence?, ANTITRUST, Summer 2012, at 53, 56–57.
The cross-elasticity of demand test for defining relevant markets comes from United States
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–95 (1956).
231 1968 Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/
1968-merger-guidelines (Aug. 4, 2015).
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of the market as a whole using a four-firm concentration ratio.232  Successive
modifications to the guidelines in 1982, 1984, 1992, and 1997 only furthered
the agencies’ insistence on predicting the effects of mergers on prices and
output through formal economic analysis including market definition, identi-
fication of market participants, and computation of the Herfindahl-Hirsch-
man Index to determine market concentration.233  Only in the Obama
Administration’s 2010 revisions did the agencies attempt to break away from
the necessity of defining relevant markets.234  By that time, however, the fed-
eral courts had become so accustomed to looking for market definition
based on the enforcement agencies’ own enforcement guidelines that the
need to predict anticompetitive price effects in a properly proven relevant
market had become firmly lodged in section 7 jurisprudence.235
As first the antitrust agencies through their merger guidelines and then
the courts through endorsement of the agencies’ approach systematically
shifted merger policy away from the incipiency standard and began requiring
formal market definition and probability of adverse price effects, Congress
acquiesced through inaction.  Whatever else it said in 1950, Congress has
thus far shown itself willing to let the courts and antitrust agencies reshape
merger law in a form far more favorable to business consolidation.
*  *  *
In sum, from the courts’ earliest forays into interpreting the Sherman
Act up through contemporary antitrust jurisprudence, the courts have mani-
fested a systematic tendency to interpret the substantive antitrust statutes
contrary to their texts, legislative histories, and often their spirit.236  Some-
times, as with the rule of reason and labor exemption, the judicial disregard
of text and purpose has occurred fairly immediately.  In other cases, as with
the Robinson-Patman and Celler-Kefauver Acts, an initial period of statutory
fidelity has slipped gradually into a period of statutory infidelity.  In some
cases, as with respect to section 5 of the FTC Act and section 3 of the Clayton
232 Id.
233 See generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines
in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2006).
234 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7
(2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010; James A.
Keyte & Kenneth B. Schwartz, “Tally-Ho!”: UPP and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 587, 591–92 (2011) (explaining how 2010 Merger Guidelines
“[m]arginalize the [r]ole of [m]arket [d]efinition”).
235 See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Stan-
dards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 415 (2006) (describing market defini-
tion as a stumbling block in merger cases).
236 Scholars have also argued that the courts have disregarded the textual meaning and
legislative purpose of the Tunney Act—a statute requiring federal courts to give approval
to antitrust consent decrees entered into in actions brought by the Justice Department. See
Darren Bush, The Death of the Tunney Act at the Hands of an Activist D.C. Circuit, 63 ANTITRUST
BULL. 113 (2018); John J. Flynn & Darren Bush, The Misuse and Abuse of the Tunney Act: The
Adverse Consequences of the “Microsoft Fallacies,” 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 749 (2003).
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Act, the courts continue to proclaim their fidelity after they functionally
move to infidelity.  In many cases, the courts stop pretending after a while
and admit quite candidly that they are taking liberties with the statute.
If this antitrust antitextualism is merely the product of common-law
methodology, one would expect to see movement away from the statute’s text
in both permissive and restrictive directions, or, to put it more crassly, both
in favor of big capital and against it.  But the movement has all been in one
direction: loosening a congressional check on big capital.  Thus, the rule of
reason allowed courts to bless large combinations of capital that the courts
deemed reasonable; narrowing the labor exemption frustrated labor’s ability
to countervail capital’s power; restricting the private right of action for treble
damages significantly curtailed the private-litigation check on business; judi-
cial narrowing of the Clayton Act’s exclusive dealing and tying restrictions
allowed (mostly big) firms to exploit market power; reading “unfair” out of
the FTC Act eliminated section 5 as a check on business morality; eviscerat-
ing the Robinson-Patman Act protections for small and independent busi-
nesses favored large and powerful businesses; and requiring proof of likely
price increases and technical relevant market definition in merger cases
immunized many large-scale mergers from legal challenge.  Throughout the
history of American antitrust law, the courts have shown a systematic ten-
dency to read down the antitrust statutes in favor of big capital.
But the story of antitrust antitextualism is not simply one of conserva-
tive/progressive ideological struggle between Congress and the courts.
Much of the action away from statutory text and purpose was accomplished
by, or with the support of, judges of the political left.  Unlike in other fields,
Congress has not responded with statutory overrides.  And far from buttress-
ing its atextual statutory readings of the antitrust laws through veiled consti-
tutional warnings about congressional overreaching, the Court has
repeatedly pulled in the opposite direction, asserting quasi-constitutional rev-
erence for antitrust law.237  Despite ample opportunity to do so, the Court
has not removed antitrust law from the reach of congressional reconsidera-
tion by constitutionalizing its atextual readings.  Antitrust antitextualism does
not follow a conventional left/right ideological pattern.  Its actual pattern is
more subtle.
III. THE IDEALISTIC CONGRESS, PRAGMATIC COURTS THESIS AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, this Article has made an empirical observation—that, from the
beginning of antitrust history, the courts have atextually read down the anti-
trust statutes in favor of big business and considered and rejected a potential
explanation: that this phenomenon primarily represents an ideological tug-
of-war between a progressive Congress and more conservative courts.  This
237 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415
(2004) (“The Sherman Act is indeed the ‘Magna Carta of free enterprise[’] . . . .” (quoting
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972))).
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final Part searches for an alternative understanding, one that is perhaps less
obvious but more fitting, and then considers its systemic implications for the
antitrust enterprise.
A. The Idealistic/Pragmatic Thesis
Congress writes expansive statutes reining in business power, the courts
(either immediately or over time) disregard the plain text of the statutes and
trim them down in favor of capital, and Congress acquiesces through inac-
tion.  Why?  The best-fitting explanation is this: the antitrust laws reside in
perennial tension between two fundamental impulses of the American politi-
cal psyche—the romantic and idealistic attachment to smallness over bigness,
and the pragmatic and often grudging realization that large-scale organiza-
tion may be necessary to achieve material advantages.  The romanticism and
idealism of the anti-bigness impulse pushes it to the fore in the popular polit-
ical arena.  Congress legislates on the popular aspiration for an egalitarian
economy organized around small proprietors and independent local busi-
nesses and freedom from economic dominance.  When the statutes come to
the courts or antitrust agencies, judges and antitrust enforcers play the prag-
matic role of balancing those popular aspirations against the contending
impulse for efficiency and material benefit.  This balancing act induces them
to give less effect to the statutes than the broad statutory texts suggest.  So
long as the judicial decisions achieve results that strike a politically accept-
able outcome between the aspirational and pragmatic impulses, Congress is
content to leave the judicial and enforcement decisions alone.
It will be impossible decisively to prove or disprove such a general thesis,
but its building blocks are well established.  A quixotic affinity for small-scale
organization of production runs from the colonial period, through the nine-
teenth century, and into the twentieth century and beyond.  In his classic
essay What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, Richard Hofstadter wrote of a
“characteristically American” antimonopoly romance born from the lack of
competing “aristocratic, militaristic, and labor-socialist theories,” manifested
in a “nation of farmers and small-town entrepreneurs—ambitious, mobile,
optimistic, speculative, anti-authoritarian, egalitarian, and competitive,” and
taking it for granted that “property would be widely diffused [and] that eco-
nomic and political power would be decentralized.”238  The anti-bigness ide-
alism runs from Jefferson’s republican agrarianism, through Jackson’s
antibank populism, and into the legislative history of the Sherman Act, where
Senator Sherman equated the power of the trusts with the power of a king239
and Senator Edmunds argued that the accumulation of private power justi-
238 RICHARD HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 195–96 (1952).
239 See 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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fied riots and revolutions.240  In the twentieth century, Brandeis encapsu-
lated the Jeffersonian sentiment in his famous title The Curse of Bigness,241
while William O. Douglas called for power to be “scattered into many hands
so that the fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or
caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional stability of a few self-
appointed men.”242  Learned Hand may have captured the impulse most
forthrightly when he asserted that the antitrust laws existed “to perpetuate
and preserve, for its own sake and in spite of possible cost, an organization of
industry in small units which can effectively compete with each other.”243
Hand’s candor about the “possible cost” of the Jeffersonian impulse
underlines its idealism and inevitable clash with a conflicting American
impulse: economic pragmatism.244  In competition with the Jeffersonian
romance with the yeoman farmer and household artisan is the Hamiltonian
vision for the commercial firm and the bank.  If Jefferson was “the poet of the
American founding,” Hamilton was the “nation builder who infused the
essential elements of permanence and stability in the American system.”245
Hamilton’s ideological heirs—corporate capitalists—would have little
patience for the fetishization of a productive smallness that would deny busi-
ness the scale and scope to advance industry for the national good.  Arguing
that large-scale industrial firms were inevitable and should be regulated
rather than broken up, Theodore Roosevelt asserted that “[b]usiness cannot
be successfully conducted in accordance with the practices and theories of
sixty years ago unless we abolish steam, electricity, big cities, and, in short,
not only all modern business and modern industrial conditions, but all the
modern conditions of our civilization.”246  When Woodrow Wilson accused
Roosevelt of preferring to regulate monopoly rather than regulating compe-
tition,247 he was not far off the mark.  The Hamiltonian tradition accepts
industrial bigness, even dominance, as the hard-nosed reality of a progressive
economy.
Although the Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian impulses are perpetually
contending, they sound in different registers—the first lyrical; the second
240 21 CONG. REC. 2726 (1890) (statement of Sen. Edmunds) (justifying antitrust as
antidote to “tyrannies, grinding tyrannies, that have sometimes in other countries pro-
duced riots, just riots in the moral sense”).
241 THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS (Osmond K.
Fraenkel ed., 1934).
242 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 536 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
243 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
244 See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 13–29 (1993).
245 Stephen Knott, “Opposed in Death as in Life”: Hamilton and Jefferson in American Mem-
ory, in THE MANY FACES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF AMERICA’S MOST
ELUSIVE FOUNDING FATHER 25, 26 (Douglas Ambrose & Robert W.T. Martin eds., 2006).
246 Theodore Roosevelt, The Trusts, the People, and the Square Deal, in DANIEL A. CRANE &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES
107, 112 (2013).
247 LETWIN, supra note 1, at 269.
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prosaic.  The rhetoric of smallness is laudatory and that of bigness defensive;
compare Peckham’s paean to the “small dealers and worthy men”248 to Taft’s
protestation that “the law does not make mere size an offence.”249  Scalia had
to abandon his considerable pride as a stylist and indulge in a verboten triple
negative to save monopoly from a presumption of illegality:  “The mere pos-
session of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market
system.”250  Americans venerate small business almost religiously; the family
entrepreneur is arguably more important as a cultural icon than as a back-
bone of the economy.251  Conversely, candidates for political office would
never find it expedient to extol the praises of big business as such, but only to
defend the benefits it may bring.  Smallness speaks to the heart; bigness to
the stomach.
When Congress writes antitrust laws, it tends to speak aspirationally,
from the Jeffersonian lobe: all combinations in restraint of trade are illegal;
human labor is not crass commerce; unfair competitive acts are forbidden;
anyone hurt can sue to be made whole and more; big businesses may not
procure better prices than small ones; the first step toward concentration
makes an acquisition illegal.  Taken at face value, these mandates would
require a dramatic reordering of industry in the direction of economic atom-
ism.  But the courts and agencies do not take them at face value.  Rather,
they seem to assume—whether consciously or unconsciously—that the anti-
trust statutes are partly substantive and partly aspirational and that the judi-
cial and executive function is to operationalize the substantive principles
while honoring the mere aspirations in their breach.  The courts speak of the
Sherman Act as representing a “competitive ideal,”252 a “comprehensive
248 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897).
249 United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920); see also United States v.
Int’l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927) (“The law . . . does not make the mere size of
a corporation, however impressive, or the existence of unexerted power on its part, an
offense, when unaccompanied by unlawful conduct in the exercise of its power.”).
250 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
251 Mansel G. Blackford, Small Business in America: A Historiographic Survey, 65 BUS. HIST.
REV. 1, 8 (1991) (“If small businesses have been vital to America’s economic development,
they have perhaps been even more important as a component of American culture.”); see
also George L. Priest, Small Business, Economic Growth, and the Huffman Conjecture, 7 J. SMALL
& EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 2 (2003) (“In the United States, largely for political and, perhaps,
historical reasons, small business has attained a status of veneration as constituting the
most basic foundation of growth in the economy.” (footnote omitted)); Richard Sylla,
Small-Business Banking in the United States, 1780–1920, in SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE
240, 241 (Stuart W. Bruchey ed., 1980) (observing that “small-business ideology has been
present throughout American history”).
252 Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984); see also Brantley v.
NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1203 (9th Cir. 2012); Town Sound & Custom Tops,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 476 (3d Cir. 1992); Ne. Tel. Co. v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 477 F. Supp. 251, 258 n.11 (D. Conn. 1978).
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charter of economic liberty,”253 or the “Magna Carta of free enterprise.”254
The loftiness of these renderings express both veneration and malleability—
the fount of the nation’s economic ideals is too important to be taken techni-
cally or literally.  Congress, in turn, declines to take umbrage at the courts’
pragmatic recalibration of the balance between Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian impulses in applying the statutes.  It is as if Congress too under-
stands that it has spoken ideals that are best not fully realized.
To be sure, the congressional idealism/judicial pragmatism thesis does
not obviate the existence of genuine ideological contestation over the opera-
tion of antitrust law between Congress and the courts, within Congress,
within the courts, and within the antitrust agencies.  Statutes have conse-
quences and can shift antitrust enforcement significantly for a period of
time—see especially the decades following the 1914 reform statutes, the
Robinson-Patman Act, and the Celler-Kefauver Act.  The idealism/pragma-
tism thesis is not that Congress writes statutes that are only aspirational or
idealistic, but rather that Congress tends to manifest anti-bigness aspirations
through the employment of statutory language and expressions of purpose
that reach more broadly than the pragmatic center of the American political
spectrum will tolerate.  Whether consciously or unconsciously, Congress and
the courts have fallen into a pattern where Congress speaks broadly and the
courts construe narrowly, without much overt hostility or recognition of con-
flict between the two institutions.  Combined with the executive functions of
the antitrust agencies in dialogue with the courts and Congress, the system as
a whole manifests an implicit compromise between the Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian ideals, where Congress expresses the Jeffersonian ideal through
legislation and the courts and agencies pragmatically mitigate its reach
through interpretation and enforcement.
The congressional idealism/judicial pragmatism thesis is descriptive, not
prescriptive.  Many objections could be raised to operating the antitrust sys-
tem this way, from normative commitments to judicial textualism as essential
to democratic legitimacy to a view that the reading down of the antitrust
statutes has contributed to overly tepid antitrust enforcement and excessive
agglomeration of economic power.  Nonetheless, although other factors
(such as judicial disapproval of Congress’s ideological commitments, as previ-
ously discussed) surely play some role as well, the congressional idealism/
judicial pragmatism thesis provides the most complete account for a phe-
nomenon that has spanned over a century of antitrust history.
B. Systemic Implications
The idealism/pragmatism explanation of antitrust antitextualism raises
systemic questions about the operation of U.S. antitrust law and potential
strategies for those who would reform it.  In particular, how should reformist
Congress write new antitrust statutes given that the courts may be inclined to
253 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
254 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
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disregard some of their textual import?  And, if writing clear statutes is no
guarantee that the courts will honor the text, are there alternatives to achiev-
ing antitrust reform?  Finally, what are the more general implications for the
jurisprudence of statutory interpretation?
1. Limitations of Writing Clear Statutes
This Article has shown that, historically, the judiciary has treated the
antitrust statutes as broad delegations to the courts to create a pragmatic
common law of competition, even when the statutes plainly said something
more specifically prohibitory.  What, then, are the strategies available to a
reformist Congress seeking to rein in business power through remedial anti-
trust legislation?
The one strategy that does not seem especially promising is simply writ-
ing clearer statutes.  The antitrust statutes that the courts wrote down in favor
of big business did not suffer from a lack of clarity or, if they did, not in the
textual implications the courts chose to ignore.  Strikingly, the courts con-
tinue to insist that the antitrust statutes are indeterminate delegations of
common-law power, even while admitting in candor that they have simply
chosen to ignore the statutes’ plain meaning in favor of a common method
of deciding antitrust cases.  For instance, in Professional Engineers, Justice Ste-
vens remarked for the Court that “the language of § 1 of the Sherman Act . . .
cannot mean what it says” and therefore that Congress must not have
intended “the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the
statute or its application in concrete situations,” thus justifying the courts in
shaping the “statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradi-
tion.”255  Given over a century’s tradition of interpreting antitrust statutes as
invitations to continue a common-law process whatever else is suggested by
the statute’s text, it is difficult to see how simply accumulating stern new lan-
guage in new texts would lead to a different result.
Even where reform statutes are textually honored in their immediate
aftermath, history shows a creeping judicial tendency to begin integrating the
reform statutes into the mainstream of antitrust jurisprudence within a few
decades.  This has been the fate of the four major antitrust reform statutes—
the FTC, Clayton, Robinson-Patman, and Celler-Kefauver Acts—each of
which was meant to rein in capital in ways that the Sherman Act did not.  In
all four instances, however, the courts incrementally began mainstreaming
the statutes into Sherman Act precedent, creating a homogenous antitrust
jurisprudence that read the textual distinctiveness out of the reform statutes.
Thus, today, cases under the FTC Act, section 3 of the Clayton Act, and the
Robinson-Patman Act are largely indistinct from Sherman Act cases,256 and
merger cases have been rolled into the same modes of price-theoretic analy-
sis that would be employed in a Sherman Act case.257  Given that neither
255 Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978).
256 Supra text accompanying notes 140–43, 165–70.
257 Supra text accompanying notes 209–12.
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statutory text nor legislative history seems to have deterred the courts from
this process within a few decades after the passage of the statutes, there is
little reason to believe that a “this time we mean it” statutory reform would
not meet the same fate.  If the courts continue to understand aspects of the
antitrust statutes as aspirationally motivated and operationally impracticable,
the previously observed pattern is likely to continue.
Again, it would be an overstatement to claim that statutory words have
no consequences or that antitrust reform statutes are doomed ab initio to
judicial culling.  But the courts’ pattern of antitrust antitextualism and their
perennial insistence that the antitrust statutes are delegations of common-law
power rather than textually actionable injunctions in all of their particulars
provide a cautionary tale for future legislatures: the dynamic of antitrust leg-
islation, enforcement, and adjudication plays out against a longstanding
backdrop of contestation over bigness, power, and efficiency that has muted
the ordinary importance of statutory language.  Writing more definite stat-
utes will not necessarily curb these habits of mind.
2. Importance of Institutions
If statutory texts have shown relatively little sustained power to reform
antitrust, what has been effective?  The answer, in short, is institutions.258
Although statutory amendments to the substance of antitrust law have not
achieved the full reforms their texts and legislative histories would suggest on
a lasting basis, significant and durable shifts in antitrust enforcement have
come about as a result as institutional reforms and institutional factors.  Sec-
tion 5 of the FTC Act may have added nothing to the Sherman Act substan-
tively, but the creation of the Federal Trade Commission has had lasting
implications for federal antitrust enforcement.259  The courts may not have
interpreted the private antitrust remedy nearly as broadly as section 4 of the
Clayton Act reads, but the delegation of antitrust enforcement authority to
“private attorneys general” has had very important long-term effects for the
substantive development of antitrust law.260  The Celler-Kefauver amend-
ments could not achieve sustained increases in antimerger enforcement
levels, but the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s creation of a premerger notification
regime radically shifted the locus and texture of merger law and policy from
adjudication before generalist judges to administrative negotiations with
agency technocrats.261  For better or for worse, changes in institutional
design have proven more consequential to antitrust enforcement than statu-
tory recalibrations of the substantive standards.
258 On the structure and interactions of antitrust’s institutions, see generally CRANE,
supra note 127.
259 See id. at 135.
260 Id. at 51–58; see also Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 54
(2008).
261 CRANE, supra note 127, at 103–04.
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This suggests that a Congress serious about changing the course of anti-
trust enforcement should pay at least as much attention to questions of insti-
tutional design and capacity as to the wording of substantive liability rules
and standards.  Over time, the courts may interpret the antitrust statutes away
from their plain wording and legislative history, but courts have less interpre-
tive power to rework institutional design.  In some cases, as with respect to
Hart-Scott, the consequence of the institutional design has been significantly
to reduce the courts’ role and transfer primary responsibility to other actors.
If Congress is concerned that future judicial interpretation may diminish the
vitality of a statute, one potential solution is to create an institutional frame-
work for enforcement that does not depend heavily on judicial
interpretation.
Of course, shifting custody of the antitrust statutes from the courts to
another institution of government does not guarantee more vigorous
enforcement.  As previously noted, much of the impetus for reading down
the enforcement norms expressed in Robinson-Patman and Celler-Kefauver
came from the antitrust agencies and presidential commissions, not the
courts.  Shifting enforcement in any direction—whether more or less aggres-
sive—and then sustaining the shift ultimately depends on political and ideo-
logical assent by key institutional actors.  To the extent that antitrust
antitextualism is merely one symptom of a broader pan-institutional impulse
to balance industrial policy between competing Jeffersonian and
Hamiltonian commitments, a systemic tendency toward antitrust moderation
may be inevitable until social, political, or economic currents recalibrate the
longstanding balance between those commitments.
3. Implications for Interpretation
The phenomenon of antitrust antitextualism is important for under-
standing the U.S. antitrust system, its history, and the possibilities for its
reform, but it also has significance for more general understandings of how
statutes are written and how their interpretation functions or should func-
tion.  Scholars have argued that Congress sometimes means statutory lan-
guage to be purely expressive, indeed that it means for the courts not to give
that language legal effect.262  But the story of antitrust antitextualism goes far
beyond judicial excision of stray words or phrases from the antitrust statutes.
In important instances, particularly with respect to the FTC and Robinson-
Patman Acts, the courts have entirely rewritten the textual meaning and legis-
lative purpose of the statute.263  Through a chronic cycle of legislative enact-
ment, judicial disregard, and implicit legislative acquiescence, Congress and
the courts have constituted the common-law system that judges and scholars
across the political spectrum now consider normalized and perhaps even
inevitable.
262 See, e.g., Jesse M. Cross, When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 453 (2018).
263 Supra text accompanying notes 165–68, 196–204.
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This pattern of judicial/legislative engagement (with the executive play-
ing an enabling role) raises both analytical and normative questions for the
jurisprudence of statutory interpretation.  Analytically and descriptively, is
antitrust law sui generis, or do other statutory domains exhibit a similar, but
perhaps unrecognized, dynamic?  Do the antitrust laws idiosyncratically oper-
ate in a space of equipoise between Jeffersonian idealism and Hamiltonian
pragmatism, with Congress implicitly assigning itself the role of idealist ora-
tor while acquiescing as the courts provide pragmatic counterbalance?  Or is
this yin and yang phenomenon, disguised in the interpretive rhetoric of
broad delegations and common-law method, a more general one, in maybe
unappreciated ways?  Once a pattern is observed in one legal domain, it
tends to be observed soon in others as well.  Finding a recurrence of the
antitrust pattern elsewhere could provide new insights on statutory interpre-
tation, separation of powers, and the de facto institutional roles of the legisla-
tive and judicial branches.
Normatively, there is much to question about the democratic legitimacy
of the implicit system of legislative declaration and judicial reformation
described in this Article.  There seems little in it that either a committed
textualist or a committed purposivist could defend, since the system entails
the courts honoring neither what Congress wrote nor what it meant.  To
rehabilitate the system’s democratic legitimacy, a subtle purposivist might say
that what Congress actually meant—in a deep sense—must be gathered from
the norms of the system itself rather than from conventional evidence such as
floor statements by members of Congress, committee reports, or other con-
temporaneous sources of public meaning.  Perhaps members of Congress
legislate against a backdrop of expectation that the courts will continue to
read down new statutes to accommodate pragmatic efficiency interests, and
consenting to this implicit system, the members feel liberated to express
more in the statute than they actually mean as prescriptive.  But if that is
wholesome democratic practice, that case is yet to be made.
Finally, if the system lacks democratic legitimacy, there is the question of
how to begin unwinding it—and whether anyone has the incentive to try.
Most committed textualists are also committed economic conservatives;264 it
would take abundant motivation from pure principle for the average Federal-
ist Society judge to restore the original meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act
or the Clayton Act’s incipiency presumption, much less mount a cataclysmic
return to section 1’s absolutist prohibition on agreements restraining trade.
Progressive judges, perhaps looking for leverage to unwind the perceived lax-
ity of Chicago School antitrust, might invoke statutory text or original mean-
ing as a foil, but they too face Pandora’s Box.  To insist on taking at face
value Congress’s words and ostensible purposes—words and purposes to
which Congress itself might not have been fully committed—would risk con-
siderable backlash after the long reign of moderating common law and the
264 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 183
(2018).
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system’s reliance on the courts to correct Congress’s textual overstatements.
So maybe it should count in favor of the system’s normative legitimacy that it
has worked for 130 years without anyone complaining too much.
CONCLUSION
It turns out that the pervasive rhetoric that the antitrust laws are a dele-
gation of common-law powers to the courts is a bit of a fig leaf covering the
courts’ declination to enforce the antitrust statutes as written.  But something
more than judicial insubordination to the will of Congress is happening.  The
pattern of engagement between the courts and Congress over American anti-
trust law’s 130-year history suggests an implicit division of responsibility for
the management of competing political impulses for industrial smallness and
bigness.  Congress expresses an idealistic preference for smallness, the courts
balance that impulse against pragmatic recognition that larger scale can
bring material benefits, and both institutions implicitly accept the other’s
role.
That it has been this way since the beginning does not mean that it must
continue to be this way forever.  At this moment of growing political and
social interest in antitrust and revival of antimonopoly sentiment, the balance
could tip decisively in favor of Brandeisianism and against the “Curse of Big-
ness.”  Judges could be trained (or retrained) to begin taking the antitrust
statutes seriously as statutory texts and begin applying them faithfully using
the (contested) methodologies they use as to other statutes.  But if judges
began taking the texts of antitrust statutes seriously, query whether Congress
would continue to write such broad statutes, or whether hydraulic pressures
would induce a more sparing approach to antitrust legislation.
Then again, for all we know, the impulse to antitrust antitextualism may
have a long tail.  Words enacted today, in the fervor of another political
moment for antitrust, may take on new meaning to the judges that examine
them in a few years’ time.  Old habits die hard, and the habit of antitrust
antitextualism grows from the very roots of antitrust history.
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